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Summary 
This thesis is a comparative study of how the European Convention of Human Rights, the 
European Union and Finland protect companies’ right to privacy in unannounced 
competition authority inspections. More precisely, it aims to establish the current scope of 
companies’ right to privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
and to assess if the European Union and Finland meet this standard. The key points of 
interests are the definition of the right from the perspective of companies, the limitations it 
sets to competition authorities, and the safeguards required to ensure that the right to privacy 
is respected. 
Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights is drafted to protect natural and legal 
persons from arbitrary actions of public authorities. This protection takes various forms. 
Pursuant to the wording of the article, the right to respect to private and family life, home 
and correspondence is protected. The article employs concepts that at the level of everyday 
language seem best suited for natural persons. During the past three decades, the European 
Court of Human Rights has interpreted the article as granting protection also to legal persons, 
companies included. The concept of home has been extended to business premises and the 
concept of correspondence to confidential communications between a lawyer and a company 
client. However, the Court has reserved contracting states a wider margin of appreciation 
regarding the rights of legal persons. 
This interpretation of Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights entails that 
unannounced competition authority inspections interfere, by their nature, with companies 
right to respect to home and, depending of the materials under inspection, also with the right 
to respect to correspondence. An interference does not amount to a violation of the article, 
but it triggers a number of safeguards to ensure that the interference is necessary and 
proportionate. The European Court of Human Rights has established in its case-law that all 
interferences with rights protected under Article 8 should be subject to prior judicial 
authorization or a posteriori judicial review. Other safeguards depend on the individual 
circumstances of each case, but judicial review has been established as an absolute 
requirement. This means that in competition authority inspections, both the inspection 
decision and the authority measures during an inspection should be subjected to judicial 
review. 
 
 
In Finland, this is not the case. Competition Act sets out a prohibition against appeal of the 
inspection decision. The inspection decision and the measures taken during an inspection 
may be appealed only if the Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority makes a 
proposition of a penalty payment to the Market Court. This entails that all interferences with 
companies’ right to privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
are not subject to judicial review. As a contracting party to the Convention, Finland is under 
the obligation to comply with relevant interpretations of the Court. The requirement of 
judicial review appears to be one. The Finnish Government is preparing a reform of the 
Competition Act, whereby this question could be addressed as a part of the reform. The 
Report of the Working Group of the reform, which is addressed in this thesis, does not 
propose any improvements in this regard. 
The European Union, for its part, is not bound by the Convention. Nevertheless, the 
Convention still plays an important role in the European Union and it does contribute to the 
fundamental rights protection of companies in the European Union. This is the case 
particularly with Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, as the fundamental 
right to privacy provided by Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union should correspond to that provided by the Convention. In practice, the question is 
more complex. Companies may subject the inspection decisions of European Commission 
to judicial review but the possibility to appeal inspection measures is more limited. Thereby, 
the European Union does not either meet the standard set out by the Article 8 of the 
Convention. 
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1. Introduction 
The three things I have enjoyed the most in my legal studies are comparative law, the term 
“dawn raid” and human rights. The first is an excellent tool to understand what laws really 
are about, the second makes office work sound exiting and the third reminds that law is a 
question of values and constant boundary-drawing. The Finnish Government kindly decided 
to initiate a competition law reform, which enables me to combine these three in my Master’s 
thesis. 
As a part of the competition law reform, the inspection rights of the Finnish Competition 
Authority (“FCCA”) are subjected to review. This is a field where different legal spheres 
meet. National law, European Union law (“EU law”) and the European Convention of 
Human Rights (“ECHR”) all provide regulations that must be complied with. These 
regulations are complimentary, in constant interaction and sometimes also conflicting. The 
aim of this thesis is to analyse this field from the perspective of companies right to privacy 
as provided by Article 8 ECHR. The question that my work aims to answer is what is the 
right to privacy of a company under unannounced competition authority inspection – a so-
called dawn raid – and how this right is respected in the EU and in Finland. 
To find the answer, following sub-questions need to be answered. What is the relationship 
between the ECHR, EU law and Finnish national legislation in this regard? What is the 
content of the right to privacy pursuant to Article 8 ECHR for companies under inspections? 
How is this right interpreted in the EU and in Finland, and what similar rights are protected 
under the instruments of the EU or national instruments? Finally, what are the safeguards 
required by the ECHR to respect the right to privacy and how do the safeguards provided in 
the EU and Finland correspond to these? 
At this point, it must be clear that the concept of human rights in the opening phrase is not 
used in the traditional meaning. This thesis does not address the rights of natural persons but 
those of legal persons, and more precisely, the rights of undertakings. It is well-established 
by the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) that undertakings also enjoy protection 
of their rights. These rights are not a question of life and death as it may be with rights of 
natural persons but more a matter of stability and predictability in the relationship between 
states and companies. There are still voices that criticise the application of human rights to 
companies. This is a conversation my thesis will not participate in. In order to save space to 
answer my research question, I will take the applicability of some human rights to companies 
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as a taken. As this reading is good enough for the ECtHR, it is good enough for my work, 
too. 
To be able to answer my research question in satisfactory detail, I focus exclusively on 
unannounced inspections taking place at business premises. The choice of unannounced 
inspections is based on the role of consent: the consent of the holder of the right may play a 
role when establishing an interference with a right. The chosen limitation means that certain 
investigative powers of competition authorities, including requests for information, will not 
be addressed. Thereby, I focus in depth only in those cases where the company is subjected 
to an authority inspection without their consent, meaning that non-compliance may lead to 
sanctions or use of coercive measures. Furthermore, competition authority inspections may 
be carried out also in residential premises. In those cases, the right under interference is also 
the right of the natural person whose home is being inspected. In home inspections, the rights 
of companies and natural persons interlink. Thereby, inspections in domestic premises will 
be excluded, save a few necessary exceptions of recent case-law.  
Another limitation is set by the nature of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”). 
The ECtHR does not provide detailed guidelines on how to carry out an authority inspection 
that respects the human rights of companies. The ECtHR assesses the lawfulness and 
proportionality of authority measures case by case. Thereby, some interpretations made by 
the ECtHR are very case-sensitive, and cannot be used as a measuring stick to assess 
situations in other contracting states. Only certain interpretations developed by the ECtHR 
are applicable to all contracting states. This entails that my study focuses on those aspects 
of competition authority inspections where the ECtHR has established requirements that 
apply in all situations. Upon studying the case-law of the ECtHR, I understood that majority 
of those rules concern judicial supervision of authority measures. Thereby, that is at the core 
of this thesis. The central safeguards required by the ECtHR are legal basis of the measure 
and judicial review of the conformity of the measures taken on the basis of the law. These 
have become minimum requirements for coercive authority measures. More particular 
safeguards, such as the contents of the inspection decisions or concrete timeframe of the 
inspection, are more case-sensitive and the case-law does not provide answers that could be 
generalized. 
The EU and individual states, like Finland, have a different approach than the ECtHR. They 
regulate all aspects of competition law infringements and their investigation. This means 
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that the EU and Finland provide detailed legislation on the definition of an infringement, the 
investigation procedure and court proceedings – the EU more detailed than Finland. Both 
aspire to have rules that enable the effective enforcement of competition goals, whilst 
respecting the rights of companies under inspections. However, EU and Finland do not 
necessarily grant human rights similar absolute value as the ECtHR does. 
The key provisions of ECHR for companies under competition authority inspections are 
Articles 6 ECHR and 8 ECHR1, which provide the right to a fair trial and, as stated above, 
the right to respect for privacy or as provided in the Convention text, the right to respect for 
family and private life, for home and for correspondence. The two articles have certain 
similarities and the rights protected are linked, to a certain extent. The right to respect for 
correspondence which is provided under Article 8 ECHR and which covers correspondence 
with a lawyer is linked to the rights of defence, which are protected under Article 6 ECHR. 
Article 8 ECHR also sets out a requirement of judicial authorization or a posteriori judicial 
review, which resembles the right to access to a court provided in Article 6 ECHR. These 
similarities cause sometimes confusion2, and the safeguards to ensure compliance with 
Article 8 ECHR may be mixed with rights of defence. Those are, however, two separate 
questions. As an example, rights of defence do not necessarily come to play if the inspection 
does not lead to a finding of an infringement of competition rules and a sanction. The rights 
protected under Article 8 ECHR have, anyhow, been interfered with even in that case and 
the necessity and proportionality of that interference should be assessed. 
Upon my study, I noticed that the literature on Article 8 ECHR and companies under 
authority inspections or searches is rather scarce. Either the focus is on Article 6 ECHR 
rights or the focus is on individuals and their right to privacy. Thereby, as a part of my thesis, 
I wanted to explain to myself and the potential readers, what is the content of that right for 
companies and what are its implications. As will be explained in the following chapters, the 
right to privacy as defined by Article 8 ECHR is a broad concept. For a company, in this 
context, it mainly means the right to decide who enters their premises and reads their 
documentation. This right is limited by the interest to prevent and punish competition 
infringements.  
                                                          
1 Pellonpää 2008, p. 32. 
2 For example Berghe and Dawes 2009, p. 421 discusses rights of defence under Article 6(1) EHCR but 
quotes interpretation made regarding Article 8 ECHR. 
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In a sense, granting authorities access to company files to investigate potential abuses does 
not sound like an outrageous human rights violation. It is a fact that some undertakings resort 
to anticompetitive practices when they carry out their businesses, and this causes harm to 
their competitors, their customers and economic activity in general. Competition authorities, 
for their part, aim to ensure that these practices are ended and the undertakings punished 
accordingly. However, authorities are human and humans make mistakes. Authorities may, 
with the best intention to ensure the enforcement of competition law, extend their mandate. 
The European Commission (“Commission”) carried out a fishing expedition at the premises 
of German railway company Deutsche Bahn to seek evidence of a number of suspected 
competition infringements. This is not to suggest that authorities in general have an interest 
to do so, but in those situations where mistakes happen, there should be a mechanism to 
identify and rectify them. The rationale of the right to privacy is to ensure that authorities do 
not obtain excessive powers. This applies to authorities in all fields, not just competition 
authorities. The right to privacy provides a perspective for the society: individuals and 
companies have their spheres of privacy, where the state may not enter without a justified 
reason. This is not to encourage the diminishing of the role of the state but to ensure 
lawfulness of its actions.  
In my thesis research, I studied the ECtHR cases where Article 8 ECHR had been applied in 
authority inspections or comparable searches with the view to identify rules that may be 
generalized and, on the contrary, that are exclusively case-sensitive or relevant only under 
certain circumstances. This part of the research was carried out in the online database of the 
ECtHR. The search function of the database enables search by article. I went through the 
judgments where Article 8 ECHR has been applied between 2007–2017 and studied the ones 
where Article 8 ECHR was applied in the context of an authority inspection or search and 
where the applicant was either a company or an individual whose business premises were 
searched due to a suspected infringement carried out as a part of their business activities. As 
for older cases, I studied the landmark cases.  
As for the part of the EU, I studied case-law on competition authority inspections to 
understand how the CJEU has interpreted and applied Article 8 ECHR, the corresponding 
Article 7 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights (“CFR”), and the general principle 
that provides a somewhat equivalent protection. I identified these cases in the database of 
the CJEU by using following search words: “Article 8 of the European” AND “competition”; 
“right to privacy” AND “competition”; “right to respect for” AND “competition”; “Article 
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7 of the Charter” AND “competition”. Where the search brought up the Opinion of the 
Advocate General, I also looked into the judgement to which it was related to. I read in more 
detail the cases that concerned competition authority inspections. 
In Finland, the case-law on the topic is far more limited, as Article 8 ECHR has been raised 
only in one case. Section 10 of the Finnish Constitution (“FC”), for its part, only protects 
natural persons. In this field, my main attempt is to analyse, if and how the right provided 
by Article 8 ECHR is – or could – be protected in Finland. To see how the right to privacy 
or related rights has been addressed in cases concerning suspected competition infringement 
as well as to study if the applicants have claimed irregularities in the inspection decision or 
procedure at the trial concerning penalty payment, I studied the judgements of the Finnish 
Market Court and Supreme Administrative Court that were issued on the basis of a 
proposition for a penalty payment issued by the FCCA. To identify the cases, I used the case 
register on the website of the FCCA, which provides a list of cases between 2003–2017. 
Some of the judgements were available at the FCCA website, the rest I searched for on the 
website of the Market Court, Finlex.fi and Edilex.fi. 
For explanations, analysis and context, I carried out a literary review of relevant research 
literature. As may be concluded from the above, the research method is legal dogmatics. The 
aim of this method is, according to the often-quoted book of Ari Hirvonen, to interpret and 
systematise legal norms, with the aim to establish the content of norms in force through 
analysis of laws and interpretations thereof3. This is where my thesis operates: I try and 
identify the level and means of protection required by the ECHR and to see how the EU and 
Finland reach this. Obviously, also the relationship between the EU and Finnish law is 
relevant. As a part of this research, I do comparisons between different legal spheres. I 
operate at the practical level, whereby the comparison is only a means of systematization. 
Comparative law within the meaning of theoretical research is left for others. As regards any 
de lege ferenda suggestions, I stay with the propositions put forward by the ECtHR. 
The recently published doctoral dissertation of Helene Andersson on dawn raids touches 
upon many of the same questions as my thesis. Andersson’s research investigates how 
Commission inspections respect the fundamental rights provided in the CFR and in the 
ECHR. This means that she addresses a number of rights, one of them being the right to 
privacy as provided in Article 8 ECHR, including the protection of legal communication, 
                                                          
33 Hirvonen 2011, 21–26.  
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and Article 7 CFR. However, this is just one of the aspects of her study. Her findings have 
provided valuable insights, but I also have reached some slightly different conclusions. I also 
focus in depth in Article 8 ECHR, with the aim to highlight its scope and content as well as 
the differences between that and Article 6 ECHR or other ECHR rights. Andersson, at times, 
is less strict in this regard. I also have carried out a review of cases until mid-July 2017, 
whereby I have some more recent materials and am able to address more recent potential 
developments than Andersson. Moreover, my thesis aims to carry out a comparison between 
the ECHR, EU law and national law, which adds an additional layer to the research. To 
conclude: I am not the first one to write on this topic but my work does have an independent 
contribution. You find it below. 
2. Question of competences: relationship between ECHR, EU and Finland in 
competition matters and related human rights 
2.1 Courts, councils and committees: mixed framework of human rights protection  
2.1.1 Introduction 
This chapter will provide an introduction into the relationships between the ECHR, EU law 
and national legislation. It sets out the international legal framework for human rights 
protection, which the right to privacy of companies under competition inspections is a part 
of. This chapter explains the role of the ECHR and more importantly, the role of the 
judgements of the ECtHR, at national level and EU level. As the latter, in particular, is an 
issue too complex to be analysed in depth in this limited space, only the legal framework 
will be set out. I will start with the general role of the ECHR, then elaborate on the role it 
plays in Finnish legislation, after which I will move to the more complex relationship 
between the ECHR and the EU. To conclude, the general role of EU law and EU fundamental 
rights in the context of Finnish competition regulation is addressed, in the very limited scope 
that is necessary for the main topic of this work. 
2.1.2 ECHR and Finland: Convention and contracting state 
The ECHR is an international human rights treaty that entered into force in 19534 and that 
currently has 47 contracting states5. By ratification, the contracting states take to respecting 
and protecting the rights enshrined in the ECHR6. The rights, for their part, are not exhausted 
                                                          
4 The Council of Europe: Complete list of the Council of Europe’s treaties.  
5 The Council of Europe: Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 005. Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
6 Article 1 of the ECHR. 
7 
 
in the Convention text, as it is a living instrument. The content of the rights protected is 
interpreted and thereby further defined by the ECtHR7. The most important judgements are 
those delivered by the Grand Chamber, but also other judgements produce valid 
interpretations8. The ECtHR has established that its interpretation of the Convention is 
evolutive, which means that the provisions are interpreted in the light of the present-day 
conditions.9 Furthermore, the ECtHR interprets the Convention in a dynamic way, to ensure 
that the essential object and purpose of the article in question are fulfilled10. This entails that 
the rights protected in 2017 are not the same as the rights in 1953. The compliance with 
individual provisions is assessed in cases taken in front of the ECtHR, but the states also 
have the general duty to “monitor the conformity of their legislation and administrative 
practice with the requirements of the Convention and the Court's case law”, as formulated 
in the Explanatory Report of Protocol 1411. This means that interpretations developed in 
individual cases have an impact on all contracting states12. Thereby, upon drafting new 
legislation, the contracting states are under the duty to take into account the developments 
of the case-law of the ECtHR and possible novel interpretations.  
Finland ratified the ECHR in 1990. The Convention was incorporated in the Finnish 
legislation by an ordinary parliamentary law.13 This means that in the Finnish hierarchy of 
norms, it has the value of an ordinary law and not a superior status14 – which is the case with 
all human rights treaties15. However, the Constitutional Law Committee (“CLC”) clarified 
that irrespective of the status of the national law incorporating the Convention, Finland as a 
state operator is bound by its provisions at all times16. The Finnish Constitution (“FC”), 
                                                          
7 The jurisdiction of the ECtHR is established in Article 32 ECHR. 
8 Cameron 2009, p. 70. 
9 Société Colas Est and others v. France, Application no. 37971/97, 16 April 2002, para 41 and Cossey v. the 
United Kingdom, Application no. 10843/84, 27 September 1990, para 35; Ervo 2009, p. 244–245. On 
principles of interpretation of the ECtHR, see Dothan 2014. 
10 Niemietz v. Germany, Application no. 13710/88, 16 December 1992, para 31. 
11 See also Viljanen 2007, p.304–305.  
12 Cameron 2009, p. 70. 
13 Laki 438/1990 ihmisoikeuksien ja perusvapauksien suojaamiseksi tehdyn yleissopimuksen ja siihen 
liittyvien lisäpöytäkirjojen eräiden määräysten hyväksymisestä (”The law on the incorporation of the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and certain regulations of 
Protocols thereof”) and asetus 439/1990 ihmisoikeuksien ja perusvapauksien suojaamiseksi tehdyn 
yleissopimuksen ja siihen liittyvien lisäpöytäkirjojen voimaansaattamisesta sekä yleissopimuksen ja 
lisäpöytäkirjojen eräiden määräysten hyväksymisestä annetun lain voimaantulosta (“Regulation of the entry 
into force of Law 438/1990”). See Pellonpää 2005, p.60. 
14 PeVL 2/1990 p. 2. 
15 Scheinin 2002, p.32. 
16 PeVL 2/1990, p.2. See also Pellonpää 2005, p. 60. 
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which came into force ten years after the Convention was introduced in Finnish legislation, 
provides in Section 22 that public authorities have the obligation to ensure the observance 
of human rights. This elevated the obligation to comply with human rights instruments at 
the level of the constitution. Moreover, the CF confers the CLC the obligation to issue 
statements on the relationship between legislative proposals and international human rights 
treaties17. This means that the conformity of legislation with the ECHR is, or should be, 
assessed at the legislative phase.  
To conclude, the ECHR sets out the obligation for the contracting states to observe both the 
compliance with the Convention text and the interpretations of the ECtHR when introducing 
new legislation and applying existing laws. A corresponding obligation is included in 
Finnish legislation by the incorporation of the Convention text as well as the obligations set 
out in the Constitution. The framework of legislation is clear, but in practice, the situation is 
more complex. The CLC does not always address the ECHR – not to mention the up-to-date 
interpretations thereof – and when it comes to right to privacy, the Committee has the 
tendency to focus on the constitutional right to private life set out in Section 10 FC, which, 
irrespective of certain similarities, is not a corresponding right, as will be established later 
in this work. 
2.1.3 ECHR and EU: inspiration without submission 
The European Union, for its part, is supposed to become a contracting party to the ECHR 
pursuant to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on the European Union (“TEU”)18. The article was 
introduced by Lisbon Treaty in 2009 but in 2014, the accession process was brought to a halt 
by the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”)19. In Opinion 2/1320, the CJEU 
identified several problem issues in the accession, most notably the binding force of the 
judgements of the ECtHR and their impact on interpretation of EU law, which is and should 
remain in the exclusive competence of the CJEU21. As of now, the ECtHR does not have 
formal jurisdiction over the acts of EU institutions22, but the ECHR still has a special role23 
                                                          
17 Section 74 of the Finnish Constitution. See also Viljanen 2001, p. 267. 
18 All current Member States of the EU are also contracting parties to the ECHR. 
19 On the accession process, see for example Raba 2015 and Andreadakis 2015. 
20 Opinion 2/13 of the Court of 18 December 2014 on Accession of the European Union to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, EU:C:2014:2454. 
21 Opinion 2/13, para 184. See also Raba 2015, p. 30–32 
22 This was explicitly stated by the ECtHR in Matthews v. United Kingdom, Application no. 24833/94, 18 
February 1999; see Pellonpää 2007, p. 352. 
23 C-112/00 Eugen Schmidberger v. Austria, EU:C:2003:333, para 71. See also Andrealakis 2015, p. 48. 
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in EU law. The EU has established its own system of fundamental rights protection, which 
the ECHR and judgements of the ECtHR are a part of24. In the EU, human rights or 
fundamental rights, as they are addressed within the EU jurisdiction25, are protected through 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (“CFR”), and through general 
principles of law. The ECHR has had a great influence in both of them.  
Fundamental rights were initially introduced in EU law as general principles of law. These 
principles are developed by the CJEU and have the status of primary law in the hierarchy of 
norms26. Fundamental rights were introduced as a general principle common to constitutions 
of Member States27 and later, also as recognised in international human rights treaties28 and 
more precisely, the ECHR, once all Member States had ratified the Convention in 197429. 
With Maastricht Treaty, the respect for fundamental rights as guaranteed by the ECHR was 
enshrined at Treaty level30. 
The CFR, which became a primary source of law with the Lisbon Treaty31, contains many 
of the rights provided in the ECHR32. Pursuant to Article 52(3) CFR, where the rights are 
corresponding, the ECHR sets out the minimum level33. Furthermore, Preamble 5 CFR 
states, by wording, that the CFR reaffirms the rights as they result from the case-law of the 
ECtHR, among other sources. Furthermore, Article 6(3) TEU ensures that fundamental 
rights as guaranteed by the ECHR and resulting from the constitutional traditions common 
to the Member States constitute general principles of EU law. Once the CFR became a 
primary source of law, the CJEU has been in the favour of applying the CFR rather than 
referring to the rights protected under the ECHR34. Still the CJEU sometimes refers to the 
ECHR, which has happened also in cases concerning competition inspections35. It may be 
concluded that the relevance of ECHR varies case by case. This kind of plurality of sources 
                                                          
24 See, for example, Raba 2015, p. 22–23.  
25 On the terminology, see Rosas and Armati 2010, p. 147. 
26 On the role of general principles of law as a source of EU law, see for example Hartley 2014, p. 144. 
27 Case C-29/69, Stauder, EU:C:1969:57, para 8. 
28 Case C-4/73, Nold, EU:C:1974:51, page 507; Hartley 2014, p. 144–149. 
29 Pellonpää 2008, p.21–22. The first reference to the ECHR was made in 1975 in the case Rutili, which 
concerned the freedom of movement. 
30 Article F Maastricht Treaty. 
31 Article 6(1) TEU. 
32 For exhaustive presentation of corresponding articles, see Explanations relating to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2007/C 303/02). 
33 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2007/C 303/02), p.17. 
34 De Búrca 2013, p. 169; Polakiewicz 2015, p. xxii.  
35 See, for example, C-583/13, Deutsche Bahn v. Commission, EU:C:2015:404 
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has been described as a characteristic of EU fundamental rights protection. The Treaties 
provide the CJEU the possibility to apply many sources side by side – or case by case.36 
The ECHR and the judgements of the ECtHR have a formal role in EU law, but the CJEU 
does not appear to be bound by the interpretations put forward by the ECtHR. Weiss has 
proposed that “the incorporation” of the ECHR provisions in the CFR would have led to also 
the incorporation of relevant case-law37, but that has not been the case. The authoritative 
interpretation is still carried out by the CJEU. As majority of human rights are not absolute, 
the actual content of the right is defined through legitimate limitations to that right38. The 
legitimacy of the limitation, for its part, is established by the court carrying out the 
assessment. In doing so, the interpreting court has the power to define, among other things, 
the required safeguards. The EU treaties and the CJEU acknowledge the importance of the 
ECHR rights, but they are applied – and more importantly, restricted39 –  in the special 
context of EU law40. This means that the scope of protection and the safeguards required 
may be different in the EU than pursuant to the interpretation of the ECtHR, even if the EU 
refers to the ECHR.  
This is also a major difference between individual Member States and the EU: Member 
States cannot reinterpret the interpretations of the ECtHR, but the EU, to a certain extent, 
retains the possibility. This, for its part, may have implications to Member States, who are 
simultaneously bound by the ECHR and the EU law. The Member States, all of which are 
contracting states to the ECHR, may be held responsible for breaches of the ECHR even 
when they are carried out applying EU legislation41. 
2.1.4 Competition law in Finland: applicability of Charter and beyond 
The FCCA inspections are governed both by EU law and national law. Pursuant to Article 3 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), the EU has exclusive 
competence in establishing the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal 
                                                          
36 Hofmann and Mihaescu 2013, p. 77–83. 
37 Weiss 2011, p. 190. 
38 Jääskinen 2015, p. 19. 
39 Pursuant to Article 52(1) CFR, the rights enshrined may be limited only if it is necessary and genuinely 
meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms 
of others. 
40 This has been formulated by the CJEU in case C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft EU:C:1970:114, 
para 4 and reaffirmed in Opinion 2/13, para 170. See also Weiss 2015, p. 83–88; Meehan 2000, p. 94. 
41 Pellonpää 2007, p. 352; Husa 2001, 49–50.  
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market42. For material competition rules, this means that national authorities must apply 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in parallel with national provisions where the suspected 
infringement has an impact on the internal market43. Where the impact is fully internal, 
Member States may have in force also national provisions. In Finland, the content of national 
provisions prohibiting anti-competitive practices corresponds to Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
The procedural rules, for their part, are subject to national legislation44. This includes also 
provisions on inspections. National rules become applicable even where the suspected 
infringement has an impact on the internal market of the EU. The principle of national 
procedural autonomy45 provides that each Member State may carry out the proceedings of 
national competition authorities and courts pursuant to their national legislation46.  
Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 
81 and 82 of the Treaty47 (“Regulation 1/2003”) provides few very limited requirements that 
have an impact on national procedure48. For the rest, procedural rules are subject to national 
legislation. In Finland, Regulation 1/2003 has led to an indirect harmonization of inspection 
rights. Article 21 of the Regulation, which provides the Commission the power to inspect 
other premises than business premises in Member States lead to the adoption of same powers 
for the FCCA49. 
However, the national procedure must ensure the effectiveness and equivalence of EU law, 
which entails that national legislation and practice must enable the effective enforcement of 
EU law and that the enforcement of EU law must be equally efficient as that of national 
legislation50. In the field of competition law, this means that national law must ensure the 
full effectiveness of EU competition law51, as well as the uniform application thereof52. This 
                                                          
42 Article 3 TFEU. On the conferral of competence to the EU, see for example Salminen 2009. 
43 Article 3 Regulation 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 
and 82 of the Treaty. 
44 Berghe and Dawes 2009, p. 410. 
45 Established by the CJEU in C-33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz, EU:C:1976:188, para. 5. 
46 Established by the CJEU in C-60/92, Otto BV v Postbank NV, EU:C:1993:876, para 14, and C-242/95, GT 
Link A/S v De Danske Statsbaner, EU:C:1997:376, paras 24–26; Rizzutto 2011, p. 569, Völcker 2014, p.1515 
47 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. 
48 Regulation 1/2003, preamble 21, Article 2; Rizzutto 2011, p. 569. 
49 HE 88/2010, Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle kilpailulaiksi. p. 77. 
50 Joined cases C‑430/93 and C‑431/93 Van Schijndel and van Veen, EU:C:1995:441, para 17; C‑129/00 
Commission v Italy, EU:C:2003:656, para 25; joined cases C‑295/04 to C‑298/04 Manfredi and Others, 
EU:C:2006:461, paras 62 and 71; joined cases C‑222/05 to C‑225/05 van der Weerd and Others, 
EU:C:2007:318, para 28, and C‑268/06 Impact, EU:C:2008:223, paras 44 to 46; Rizzutto 2011, p. 569. 
51 C-557/12, Kone AG v. ÖBB-Infrastruktur AG, EU:C:2014:1317, para. 32. 
52 Van Gleynenbreugel 2011, p. 523. 
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puts forward both a positive and a negative requirement. National law must provide 
provisions to enable the effective enforcement of EU competition law and these provisions 
must be effectively implemented53. It also sets out a prohibition of national procedural rules 
that make the enforcement more difficult and less effective54. This applies in particular to 
judicial proceeding where the decisions of competition authorities are challenged.55 As for 
now, this has not been a question in Finland, as the effectiveness of the procedure has not 
been challenged. Furthermore, Finnish legislation provides national competition authorities, 
for the part of inspection rights, corresponding competences to those the Commission enjoys 
under the Regulation 1/2003. 
Another way EU law may impact competition proceedings is through the CFR. Where the 
authorities apply EU law, also fundamental rights protection is triggered. The Member States 
must comply with the CFR when applying or implementing EU law56. The applicability of 
CFR is strictly limited to that context. This entails that upon the application of EU 
competition rules, the authorities are bound by the right to privacy as set out in Article 7 
CFR, which corresponds to Article 8 ECHR. This will be addressed in further detail later. 
The Proposal for a Directive to empower the competition authorities of the Member States57 
is set out to govern situations where national authorities apply Article 101 and 102 alone or 
in parallel with national legislation58. The Proposal will be addressed in detail in Chapter 
2.2.2. The justification for the chosen approach in the Proposal is that different competences 
in enforcement of national competition law and EU law do, pursuant to the Commission, 
“hamper the effectiveness of the enforcement of competition law in the internal market”59. 
This entails that also the provisions of national law must be enforced in compliance with the 
directive in those cases, where Articles 101 or 102 TFEU are applicable.  
                                                          
53 C-439/08, Vlaamse federatie van verenigingen van Brood- en Banketbakkers, Ijsbereiders en 
Chocoladebewerkers (VEBIC) VZW, EU:C:2010:739, para 56. 
54 Established by the CJEU in C-106/77, Simmenthal, EU:C:1978:49, paras 20–22. 
55 Ibid, para 57. 
56 These rules were initially formulated regarding human rights as general principles of EU law in C-260/89, 
ERT, EU:C:1991:254, para 42 and in C-5/88, Wachauf v. Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft, 
EU:C:1989:321, para 19; Hartley 2014, p. 149–150.   
57 Proposal for a Directive to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more 
effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market on 22 March 2017 
COM(2017) 142 final. 
58 Proposal, Article 1. 
59 Proposal, Preamble 4. 
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The CJEU formulated in Åkerberg Fransson that where the national provisions implement 
EU law, the CFR provides minimum level of protection at national level60. Pursuant to the 
judgement, not only provisions transposing directives trigger CFR but also national 
legislation implementing obligation imposed upon a Member State by the Treaty61. Thereby, 
if the proposed directive comes into force in the suggested form, it is possible that the CFR 
would set the minimum level also to national enforcement procedures where Articles 101 or 
102 are applied. This is stipulated also by Article 3 of the Proposal, pursuant to which where 
the national authorities exercise powers referred to in the Directive, they must be subject to 
appropriate safeguards “in accordance with general principles of Union law and the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union”. The Preamble refers only to situations of 
exercise of conferred powers. 
2.2 Competition authority inspections 
2.2.1 Regulatory framework 
The right to privacy is a beautiful swamp and thereby, an accurate map is necessary. As the 
topic is the right to privacy in unannounced competition authority inspections, I will start by 
the description of these inspections and the competences of European and Finnish 
authorities. After this, it is possible to understand how the inspections interfere with the right 
to privacy and, on the contrary, what kind of aspects of the inspections are – or should be – 
limited by the right. This could also be labelled as the boring part, as it contains long 
explanations of what the competition authorities are entitled to inspect and where. However, 
this information is relevant to understand the interference with the right to privacy these 
inspections may constitute. Also the decisions taken and their appealability is important 
later, as is the legal basis of the inspection rights. These questions will be addressed in 
Chapters 3 and 4, which may be called the fun part.  
The EU law and Finnish competition law provide competition authorities the right to carry 
out unannounced inspections at company premises where they suspect breaches of 
competition rules. The Commission has the competence to carry out inspections where it 
suspects a breach of EU competition law and the FCCA is competent to carry out inspections 
to investigate both breaches of EU law and national competition law. The ECHR does not, 
obviously, have provisions governing specially competition law inspections. Through the 
                                                          
60 C‑617/10, Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105, paras 19–21 and 29; Bernitz 2015, p. 
199. 
61 Ibid, para 28. 
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interpretation of Article 8 ECHR, the ECtHR has provided general limitations to authority 
inspections and searches and seizures. In this chapter, I will provide a definition of inspection 
powers of competition authorities in the EU and Finland. 
2.2.2 Reform of Competition Act  
As mentioned above, the subject of this thesis was inspired by the reform of the Finnish 
Competition Act 948/2011 initiated by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment 
(“MEAE”). As a part of this process, also the provisions regarding the inspection rights of 
the Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority (“FCCA”) will be reviewed. At the 
moment of writing this thesis, the reform is still mid-way. The reform will be take part 
gradually: the Governmental Proposal on the first set of reforms is expected by the end of 
the year and the MEAE presumes to make further changes once the Directive to empower 
the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure 
the proper functioning of the internal market is issued62. A ministry-appointed Working 
Group on the Reform of the Competition Act63 (“Working Group”) published its final report 
on 14 March 201764 (“Working Group Report”) with propositions for future provisions. The 
changes suggested by the Working Group may be rejected, integrated partially or fully. This 
thesis work will reflect on the propositions put forward by the Working Group. 
One of the central questions addressed in the report is the right to respect for privacy as 
prescribed by Article 8 ECHR. This was a task explicitly assigned to the Working Group by 
the MEAE. The MEAE expressed in its decision establishing the Working Group that the 
prohibition to appeal the FCCA inspection decisions should, potentially, be reviewed in the 
light of Article 8 ECHR. The decision also states that the functioning and the effectiveness 
of the inspections should be assessed from the perspective of the rights of companies.65 
The Working Group proposed changes to several provisions of the Competition Act, of 
which I will address only the ones related to the inspection procedure. Firstly, it proposes 
that inspections may be continued at the premises of the FCCA or other authority in the 
                                                          
62 Email reponse of Virve Haapajärvi, negotiating office of MEAE, 8 September 2017. 
63 In Finnish “Kilpailulain uudistamista koskeva työryhmä”. The working group consisted of representatives 
of the MEAE, the FCCA, the Market Court, the Supreme Administrative Court, the Finnish Bar Association 
and relevant industry organizations. 
64 Kilpailulain uudistamista koskevan työryhmän mietintö 16.3.2017 (”The report of the Working Group on 
the reform of the Competition Act”) 
65 Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriö: Päätös 25.8.2015 Kilpailulain uudistamista koskevan työryhmän asettaminen. 
(“The decision of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment of 25 August 2015. The establishment 
of Working Group on the reform of the Competition Act”) 
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presence of a representative of the company. Secondly, also phones, tablets and other 
portable mobile devices may be subjected to inspection. This is formulated in the report by 
addressing the inspection as “device-neutral”. Thirdly, the right to ask for explanations 
would be extended also to inspections of domestic premises of company staff. Fourthly, the 
Working Group proposes that information exchange between national and Nordic authorities 
should be improved, meaning that the exchange of confidential information would be made 
easier between national authorities and enabled between Nordic competition authorities, 
who are parties to the Agreement between Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden 
concerning cooperation in matters of competition66.67 
On the contrary, the Working Group proposes that the current prohibition to appeal the 
FCCA inspection decisions would be maintained. Similarly, the assessment of documents 
allegedly containing privileged communication between an external lawyer and the client 
company would be carried out in an internal procedure of the FCCA, a procedure which the 
FCCA already follows. This procedure would be enshrined in the reformed Competition 
Act.68 
The propositions put forward by the Working Group are in line with the recommendations 
of the European Competition Network (“ECN”). The ECN recommends that national 
legislation provides the possibility to continue inspections at authority premises69, that the 
authorities have the right to inspect all devices and all data formats and that the authorities 
have the right to ask for explanations at all inspected premises70. 
These recommendations may be elevated also at the level of a directive. The Commission 
issued the Proposal for a Directive to empower the competition authorities of the Member 
States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the internal 
market on 22 March 2017 (“Proposal”). The Proposal contains provisions on various aspects 
of competition authority competences, including financing, inspection powers and fining 
powers. For the part of inspection rights, the Proposal obliges the Member States to enable 
continued inspection at authority premises71 and to enable the inspection of all data, 
                                                          
66 Nordic co-operation would require Finland to became a party to the Agreement. 
67 Working Group Report, p. 15–16.  
68 Ibid, p. 15–16.  
69 ECN recommendation on the power to collect digital evidence 18 November 2013, para 8. 
70 ECN Recommendation on powers to investigate enforcement measures 9 December 2013, paras 21c, 21 
d, and 21 e. 
71 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council to empower the competition 
authorities, Preamble 24 and Article 6(1)(c).  
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irrespective of the form it is stored in72. As for the right to ask explanations on other 
premises, the Proposal does not set out a requirement to enable this. The Proposal only sets 
out the requirement for the Member States to enable the competition authorities to ask 
explanations in inspections of business premises. In other premises, this is optional.73 Where 
the proposed directive would enter into force in its current form, Finnish legislation should 
provide the right to continue inspections at authority premises and the right to inspect all 
mobile devices. 
2.2.3 Commission: investigator, prosecutor and decision-maker 
In the EU, the authority competent to enforce competition rules is the Commission. The 
inspection powers of the Commission have their basis in the prohibitions against anti-
competitive practices set out in Article 101 and 102 TFEU. Article 101 TFEU prohibits anti-
competitive agreements and the abuse of dominant position is prohibited under Article 102 
TFEU. The aim of these articles is to ensure the competitiveness of the markets, increase 
consumer welfare and, to a certain extent, contribute to the functioning of the internal market 
of the European Union74. The powers to enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are provided in 
Article 105 and Article 103. Article 105 TFEU provides that the Commission is the 
competent body to investigate suspected infringement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU75.  
Article 103 TFEU provides the competence to introduce secondary legislation to enable the 
enforcement of the prohibitions76. The inspection procedure is regulated under Regulation 
1/200377, which grants the Commission the powers of inspection under Article 20 and 21 as 
well as the right to fine companies infringing articles 101 and 102 TFEU78. 
The inspection procedure is regulated under Regulation 1/2003. The Commission may carry 
out informal inspections with the permission of the company in question79 but majority of 
inspections are based on Commission authorizations, which require the consent of the 
                                                          
72 Ibid, Preambles 4 and 21. 
73 Ibid, Article 6(1)(e) and Article 7(3) 
74 Vestager 2017, speech delivered 10 May 2017; Vestager 2016, speech delivered 1 December 2016; C-
286/13, Dole Food and Dole Fresh Fruit Europe v Commission, EU:C:2015:184, para 121; C-501/06, 
GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission, EU:C:2009:610, para 63; on the historical development, see Jones 
and Sufrin 2011, p. 42–54. 
75 On the interpretation of the article, see for example Tosato and Bellodi 2006, p. 10; Papadopoulos 2010 
p. 167.  
76 On the interpretation of the article, see for example Tosato and Bellodi 2006, p. 12. On general 
presentation of the hierarchy of norms within the European Union, see for example Tosato and Bellodi 
2006, 1–8. 
77 Chapter V (Articles 17–22) Regulation 1/2003.  
78 See, for example, Jones and Suffrin 2011, p. 1043. 
79 Tosato and Bellodi 2006, p. 114. 
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company or decisions, which enable the Commission to operate also in the absence of the 
permission of the company. Article 20 of the Regulation authorizes the Commission to 
inspect business premises and Article 21 authorizes the inspection of other relevant premises, 
such as home premises of directors, managers and other members of staff. Inspections are 
not limited to companies suspected of competition infringements, but the Commission may 
also inspect the business premises of third parties.80 Thereby, the Commission inspections 
may take place in business premises and, in certain cases, on domestic premises. The 
Commission principally carries out the inspections at the company premises and only in 
exceptional situations does it continue the inspection at its own premises81. 
The inspections are authorized by an inspection decision taken by the Commission under 
Articles 20(4) or 21(1) and (2). Pursuant to the articles, the decision sets out the subject 
matter, purpose and scope of the inspection. The inspection decision is subject to appeal in 
the General Court. The Commission may not use force, whereby upon resistance, it must ask 
the Member State authorities for assistance82. 
Pursuant to Articles 20 and 21 of the Regulation, during an inspection, the inspecting 
officials and other authorized persons may enter any premises, land and vehicles of 
undertakings and associations of undertakings or, upon reasonable suspicion, any other 
premises, land and vehicles. In the inspection of business premises, the Commission is 
entitled to examine the books and other records related to the business, irrespective of the 
medium in which they are stored and to take copies thereof. This includes all databases, 
computers, tablets and other mobile devices and external information storage devices, such 
as external hard drives and cloud storages, as well as private devices that are used for work 
and are situated at business premises upon inspection83. Furthermore, it has the right to seal 
the business premises, books or records. Lastly, the agents have the right to ask for 
explanations on relevant facts or documents and to record the answers.  
If the company under inspection refuses to produce requested documents or give 
explanations requested, the Commission may take a decision on a fine or a periodic penalty 
payment. This decision is subject to appeal in the General Court.84  
                                                          
80 Ibid, p. 118. This was the case in Almamet, where the appealing company complained about an inspection 
carried out at the premises of another company. T-410/09, Almamet v. Commission, EU:T:2012:676. 
81 De Jong and Wesseling 2016 p, 327. 
82 Berghe and Dawes 2009, p. 410. 
83 Explanatory note on Commission inspections pursuant to Article 20(4) of Council Regulation no 1/2003. 
84 Articles 23 and 24 Regulation 1/2003. 
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Where the Commission identifies an infringement of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU, it may order 
the company to end the infringement pursuant to Article 7 Regulation 1/2003 as well as 
impose a fine pursuant to Article 23 or/and a periodic penalty payment pursuant to Article 
24 Regulation 1/2003. In the case-law of the CJEU, this decision is called final decision, 
which is the term that shall be used below85. Also this decision is subject to appeal to the 
General Court under action for annulment pursuant to Article 263 TFEU. 
Under Regulation 1/2003, the Commission has wide powers86. It has the right to order an 
inspection and carry it out in compliance with the Regulation. The right to use coercive 
measures and carry out inspections at non-business premises is subject to prior authorization 
of national court87, but the margin of appreciation of a national court is limited88. 
Furthermore, the Commission has the power to impose a fine where it identifies an 
infringement of competition law89. Thereby, the Commission has the powers to investigate 
a suspected infringement, carry out prosecutorial measures and take binding decisions90. As 
pointed out by Schweitzer, among others, this brings about a potential prosecutorial bias – 
which must be balanced out with procedural safeguards as well as judicial review.91 From 
the perspective of the right to privacy pursuant to Article 8 ECHR, alone the power to carry 
out investigations triggers the requirement for effective safeguards and judicial review, as 
will be established below. The vast scope of Commission competences further highlights the 
need for effective control mechanisms.  
The EU inspection is carried out by the Commission and assisting national authorities of the 
Member State in which the inspection takes place. The sanctions for breaches of Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU are fines. However, the CJEU considers them punitive fines, whereby 
the nature of the process is criminal92. Similarly, the Human Rights Committee of the ECtHR 
                                                          
85 See, for example, T‑135/09, Nexans France and Nexans v Commission, EU:T:2012:596, para 132; Joined 
cases T-305/94 to T-335/94, Limburgse Vinyl Maatschappij and Others v. Commission, EU:T:1999:80, para 
413. 
86 Andreangeli 2013, p. 177– 180; De Jong and Wesseling 2016, p. 326. 
87 Article 21(3) Regulation 1/2003.  
88 This will be addressed in further detail below.  
89 Depending on the turnover of the company, these fines may be significant. The fines imposed upon cartel 
participants may amount to billions of euros. See for example Commission Decision of 19 July 2016, Trucks, 
no 39824, where the five participant undertakings were fined a total of 2.9 billion euros. 
90 Schweitzer 2013, p. 491. 
91 Schweitzer 2013, p. 491. 
92 C-235/92, Montecatini SpA v Commission, EU:C:1999:362, para 176 and C-199/92, Hüls AG v Commission, 
EU:C:1999:358, para 150;  Savola 2006, p. 855. 
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has labelled punitive fines as criminal in nature93 whereas compensatory penalty payments 
are not, as established by the ECtHR94. 
2.2.4 Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority: investigator, adjudicator and 
proposal-maker 
The competences of the Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority (“FCCA”) are based 
on Competition Act. These rights may be viewed as corollaries to the Commission inspection 
rights described above, as a part of the provisions are modelled after Regulation 1/200395. 
Major differences lie in the nature of the decisions taken and the competence to impose fines. 
The FCCA has the competence to investigate suspected breaches of Competition Act96 and, 
on its own initiative or on the initiative of the Commission, investigate suspected breaches 
of EU competition regulations97. Similarly, at the initiative of the Commission, the FCCA 
has the competence to assist Commission in carrying out an inspection in Finland. The 
procedural rules set out below are applicable to all situations above.98 
Section 31 provides the right to initiate proceedings upon finding that a company is acting 
in breach of the Competition Act or EU competition regulations. Competition Act does not 
include provisions regarding the content of the inspection decision, but in the preparatory 
works it is stated that the inspection decision must express in a sufficiently detailed way 
what is the purpose of the gathering of information and what is the legal basis thereof.99 
Contrary to the Commission decision to authorize an inspection, the FCCA decision 
authorizing an inspection is not considered a formal authority decision subject to appeal but 
a preparatory decision100. Thereby, any suspected irregularities in the inspection decision 
may be appealed only in the context of potential proposal for a penalty payment to the Market 
Court. 
Section 35 Competition Act provides the FCCA the right to carry out inspections on the 
business premises, storage facilities, land, and vehicles controlled by the undertaking. 
                                                          
93 Société Stenuit v France, Application No 11598/85, 27 January 1992; Savola 2006, p. 855. 
94 Neste St Petersburg et al. v Russia, Application No 69042/01, 3 June 2004; Messina 2007, p.189. 
95 He 88/2010 p. 36; Kuoppamäki 2014, p. 51. 
96 Section 5 Competition Act prohibits anticompetitive agreements and Section 7 Competition Act prohibits 
abuse of dominant position. 
97 Section 3 Competition Act provides that when the restraint may affect trade between Member States, 
also Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are applicable. 
98 Section 35 and Section 36(2) Competition Act. 
99 HE 88/2010, p.88. See also Aalto-Setälä 2015, p. 49. 
100 HE 243/1997: Hallituksen esitys Eduskunnalle laeiksi kilpailunrajoituksista annetun lain ja eräiden siihen 
liittyvien lakien muuttamisesta, p.35; Petäjäniemi-Björklund 2008, p. 460. 
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Section 36 provides the right to carry out inspections also on other premises, if a reasonable 
suspicion exists that books or other documents relating to the business and the object of 
investigation may be held there, and if these may have relevance in proving a serious 
violation of Finnish or European competition law. The latter inspection is subject to prior 
authorization of the Market Court, which enables the Market Court to prohibit the inspection 
if it considers it arbitrary or excessive101. 
In the inspection of business premises, the FCCA – just like the Commission – has the right 
to examine the business correspondence, books, computer files, other documents, and data 
of an undertaking or association of undertakings, which may be relevant for ensuring 
compliance with competition law, and to take copies thereof. It also has the right to obtain 
information from an external service provider, who provides information storage services 
for the company under inspection, such as a cloud storage service provider102.  As the 
existing legislation does not explicitly grant the right to inspect mobile devices such as 
mobile phones, the FCCA does not inspect them103.  
The Working Group proposes that the reformed Competition Act would grant the authorities 
the right to inspect all data irrespective of the storage device used. Thereby, also mobile 
phones and tablets would be subject to inspections104. The report does not clarify if this is 
extended only to devices owned by the company, but the proposed reform would, by 
wording, enable the FCCA to inspect all devices containing data of the company. This 
formulation is very wide – and could bring personal devices situated at the company 
premises under inspection. This is the case with Commission inspection powers. The 
Working Group admits that such devices may contain information of individual employees 
of the undertaking that is protected by the right to privacy105. The report does not propose 
any safeguards to limit the interference with this right, but it states that the FCCA should be 
particularly cautious when inspecting such devices106.  
The officials inspecting the data carry out a search by using relevant keywords and “other 
selection criteria that may be of relevance in detection of the matter under inspection”. Once 
                                                          
101 Section 36(3) Competition Act. 
102 Section 37(2) Competition Act; HE 253/2014: Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle laiksi kilpailulain 37 §:n 
muuttamisesta, p.1. 
103 Working Group Report, p.26. 
104 Ibid, p.26–27.  
105 Ibid, p. 27. 
106 Ibid,p. 27. 
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the officials have identified the materials that are relevant in detection of the mater under 
inspection, these materials are copied for the use of the authority, and they are also handed 
to the company under investigation. The authority destroys other materials and temporary 
copies.107  
Furthermore, the FCCA has the right to seal the business premises, business correspondence, 
documents, and data for a period necessary for the investigation. Lastly, the officials have 
the right to ask for explanations on relevant facts or documents and to record the answers.108 
As for now, the right is limited to inspections of business premises, but as stated above, the 
Working Group proposes that this right would be extended also to inspections carried out on 
non-business premises109. Majority of the competition authorities of EU Member States have 
this right110, and it is recommended by the European Competition Network111. 
The Working Group proposes also the possibility to continued inspections at the premises 
of the FCCA or at the premises of other state authorities, when the inspected material is 
“data”, the concept of which covers all information in a computer or an equivalent 
information system or the data carrier.112 Data materials include, among others, back-up 
copies from external servers, email dossiers and information contained in servers. The 
inspected data would be a temporary copy of the original. To safeguard the inspected data, 
the inspection should be carried out in a designated room or rooms and only authority 
officials identified in the inspection decision have access to the data.113 The right to inspect 
data at the premises of the FCCA would be limited exclusively to the copies of the data, and 
the original data would remain at the disposal of the undertaking.114 Pursuant to the Working 
Group, the undertaking and its legal representative would have the right to be present also 
in the continued inspection. The FCCA would inform the undertaking of the dates it carries 
out the inspection of the materials.115 
                                                          
107 Berglund, Peter, the data specialist of the FCCA in Ibid, p. 21–22. 
108 Section 37(1) and 37(3) Competition Act. 
109 Working Group Report, p. 41–42.  
110 ECN Recommendation on powers to investigate enforcement measures 9 December 2013, p. 27. 
111 ECN recommendation on the power to collect digital evidence 18 November 2013, p. 13. 
112 Working Group Report, p. 19–20. 
113 Ibid, p 20–21. 
114 Ibid, p. 25. 
115 Ibid, p. 23. 
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Where the FCCA establishes an infringement of Competition Act or Articles 101 or 102 
TFEU, it may order an undertaking to bring competition infringement to an end116. Contrary 
to the Commission, the FCCA does not have the competence to take decision imposing fines. 
Based on its investigation, it may make a proposal to penalty payment for the Market 
Court117, which for its part assesses the evidence provided and takes final decision 
concerning the infringement and the amount of fine118. Thereby, the final decision in 
competition infringement cases is taken by the Market Court, not by the FCCA. 
According to legal literature and preparatory works, the procedure to investigate suspected 
breaches of competition law, to which the inspection is a part of, is administrative in 
nature119. However, the Supreme Administrative Court recently stated that penalty payments 
for breaches of competition law fall in the ambit of Article 6(1) ECHR120, with a reference 
to case Jussila v Finland, in which a tax surcharge was established to be of criminal nature 
because it was punitative and with a deterring aim121. Thereby, it is possible that the Supreme 
Administrative Court ruling is a change in this discourse. This has, however, mainly 
repercussions to procedural requirements and relevance regarding Article 6 ECHR. 
3. Right to privacy: human right, fundamental right, and many things more 
3.1 Right to privacy: introduction 
The right to privacy is a very vast concept and depending on the context, it covers various 
fields from data protection to right to abortion, last name or even protection against 
environmental harm122. Marks and Clapham describe the right to privacy as a “catch-all 
human right”, which covers all the fields of human life that are not protected under other 
rights123. Pursuant to Michael, the right to privacy is the most difficult human right to define 
and confine124. The right to privacy has two dimensions: it may be described as the right to 
our own physical integrity, property and thoughts as well as the right to information and 
                                                          
116 Section 9 Competition Act. 
117 Section 12 Competition Act. 
118 Chapter 2 Section 1(2) Oikeudenkäynnistä markkinaoikeudesta annettu laki; Section 51(1) 
Hallintolainkäyttölaki, and Section 13 Competition Act.  
119 Hiltunen, Kuoppamäki and Laine 2013, p. 67; Kilpailulaki 2010 -työryhmä 2009, p. 46–51; HE 162/1991: 
Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle laiksi kilpailunrajoituksista,  p. 5 and 12. 
120 KHO 2016:221, Valio v KKV, para 245. 
121 Jussila v Finland, Application no. 73053/01, 23 November 2006- 
122 The term was used for the first time by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis in their article ‘The Right 
to Privacy’ in Harvard Law Review, Volume IV, No 5, 15 December 1890. See Marks and Clapham 2005, p. 
260. 
123 Marks and Clapham 2005, p. 263. 
124 Michael 1994, p. 1. 
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knowledge concerning us125. In this thesis, the focus is on the first dimension of the right to 
privacy. The second dimension of data collection and data protection is left out.  
Right to privacy protects natural and legal persons from arbitrary actions of public 
authorities. In this way, the core of the right is the limitation of state power, which means 
that state may interfere with the private aspects of life only for – to put it simply – a good 
reason126. To protect the right, the state may also have the duty to protect individuals from 
interferences by non-state actors127, but this aspect is beyond the scope of this work. 
The ECHR, CFR or the Finnish Constitution (“FC”) do not employ the word privacy. The 
ECHR provides the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence in 
Article 8 ECHR. The CFR includes a corresponding right in Article 7 CFR, but the word 
“correspondence” is replaced with “communications”. The FC provides by Section 10 that 
the private life, honour and the sanctity of the home are guaranteed128. The ECtHR does not 
use the term right to privacy in its judgements when referring to Article 8 ECHR. The CJEU, 
for its part, refers to a multitude of terms, right to respect for privacy included129. The term 
is widely employed in legal literature, where it is generally used to address the rights 
protected by Article 8 ECHR, by Article 7 CRF and as a general principle of EU law as well 
as a constitutional right in Finland. In this way, the term “right to privacy” is used to address 
only part of the potential dimensions of the concept. I use the term in the same way, 
excluding the dimension of data protection. 
The ECtHR has its own interpretation of the right to privacy, as do the EU and Finland. The 
ECtHR case-law gives an extensive explanation of the right, as it has applied Article 8 ECHR 
thousands of times. This concept of privacy is relevant in the EU as well, as Article 7 CFR 
is modelled after Article 8 ECHR130, and the CJEU has referred to Article 8 ECHR in various 
cases, and sometimes even applied it. Finland, as established above, is bound by the ECHR, 
which means that “privacy” should be protected at least at the level prescribed by the ECHR. 
                                                          
125 Ibid, p. 3 and 133. 
126 Marks and Clapham 2005, p. 260–261; Neuvonen 2014, p. 16; In the context of ECHR, see Niemietz v. 
Germany, Application no. 13710/88, 16 December 1992, para 31. 
127 Viljanen 1996, p. 803; Niemietz v. Germany, para 29. 
128 In the unofficial Finnish translation, the title of the section is incorrectly “the right to privacy”. 
129 In Nexans, the Court refers to right to respect for privacy, in Deutsche Bahn to inviolability of private 
premises, in C-94/00, Roquette Frères v. Commission, EU:C:2002:603, to sphere of private activities of any 
person, natural or legal. 
130 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2007/C 303/02), p. 4. 
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However, the Finnish legal system has also an autonomous concept of privacy – or private 
life – which is protected by Section 10 FC. This right differs from the right protected under 
Article 8 ECHR – especially when the rights of companies are in question. The difference is 
not always fully acknowledged in Finland. 
In the following chapters, I will provide a definition of the right to privacy as it is applicable 
to companies and more precisely, companies subjected to authority inspections. I will start 
with the definition of the ECHR, as that sets the standard for contracting states such as 
Finland and, to a limited extent, to the EU as well. The EU law concept of privacy and the 
Finnish constitutional right to privacy will be examined to the extent that is necessary to 
highlight relevant differences between the concepts. Once this is done, it is time to address 
the safeguards to the right and the differences between different jurisdictions. 
3.2 Companies right to privacy in competition authority inspections pursuant to ECHR 
3.2.1 Introduction to Article 8 ECHR: what it protects, whom it protects, and why it 
protects  
Article 8 ECHR provides by its first paragraph that everyone has a right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his correspondence. The second paragraph sets out the 
rules for legitimate interferences with this right. The essential purpose of Article 8 ECHR is 
to protect individuals from arbitrary actions of public authorities131, and to limit all legitimate 
interferences to sheer necessity. This chapter will define the substance of the rights protected 
under Article 8 ECHR in the context of undertakings and competition authority inspections. 
As will be explained in greater detail below, Article 8 ECHR provides protection to both 
natural persons and legal persons. The ECHR is a human rights instrument, but some of these 
rights are extended to legal persons as well, undertakings included132. This is enabled by 
Article 34 ECHR, which provides that persons, non-governmental organizations and groups 
of individuals have access to the ECtHR. Pursuant to the ECtHR, the term “non-
governmental organizations” includes, among others, legal entities, companies, foundations 
and associations133.  
                                                          
131 Niemietz v. Germany, para 31. 
132 On historical development on the human and fundamental rights of companies, and analysis on ECHR 
articles applicable to companies, see Muijsenbergh and Rezai 2012; Emberland 2006. 
133 Oliver 2015, p. 677. 
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Article 8 ECHR protects a variety of rights134, and only a part of them is relevant for 
companies. Companies under state authority inspection may enjoy the right to respect to 
home, correspondence and, in certain limited circumstances, private life. The right to respect 
to home provides the protection of company premises and home premises of individual 
employees and the right to protection of correspondence provides protection to company 
correspondence between a lawyer and a client, which is protected by the legal professional 
privilege (“LPP”). The right to protection of private life is relevant only in the case of natural 
persons, which means individual entrepreneurs or the individual employees of companies, 
in which case they enjoy the protection of private information included in the documents the 
authority copies or inspects. As competition authority inspections by their nature take place 
at the premises of the company and often include the risk of inspection of documents labelled 
as privileged correspondence, they normally interfere with at least one of the rights protected 
under Article 8 ECHR.  
3.2.2 Inspection or search – and why it does not really matter 
The ECHR sets limitations to the inspection rights of authorities of contracting states mainly 
through Article 8 ECHR, which provides the right to privacy. Also other provisions, 
including Article 6 ECHR and rights of defence protected under it, are relevant. At the outset, 
contracting states retain the right to carry out inspections and searches when investigating 
offences135. The ECtHR has formulated that such measures may be acceptable to obtain 
physical evidence of certain offences136, including anti-competitive practices137. This entails 
that competition inspections, at the outset, are acceptable measures under the ECHR. 
The inspections and searches investigated by the ECtHR have been either administrative 
procedures or criminal procedures, depending on the national legislation and practice. Some 
of the provisions of the ECHR, namely Article 6 ECHR, draw a distinction between criminal 
procedures and other procedures138. For the application of Article 8 ECHR, the nature of the 
                                                          
134 See Mowbray 2007, p 488–597; Marks and Clapham 2005, p. 264–267; Kilkelly 2003; for historical 
comparison Morrisson 1967, p. 133. 
135 Société Colas Est and others v. France, Application no. 37971/97, 16 April 2002, para 47 
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procedure is not decisive. Pursuant to the case-law of the ECtHR, the interpretations 
developed in administrative cases are applicable to criminal ones and vice versa. The ECtHR 
has held that these situations are comparable139. Furthermore, in Société Colas the ECtHR 
held that an inspection interferes with the rights protected under Article 8 ECHR irrespective 
of the inspecting authority140. Thereby, both the inspections of competition authorities141 and 
police officers constitute an interference with Article 8 ECHR rights. All authority measures 
that include an entry into premises or inspection of documents without the consent of the 
subject of the right amount to an interference. What is decisive is the entry into a protected 
sphere without a permission142.  
In Berhn Larsen, the ECtHR held that where the authority inspection is not enforceable on 
the pain of criminal sanctions but may lead to purely administrative consequences, such as 
discretionary tax assessment, it is not comparable to a search under criminal law143. 
However, this only led the ECtHR to conclude that the interference with Article 8 ECHR 
rights was not as severe as in majority of the cases concerning searches and seizures under 
criminal law. It was, nevertheless, considered as an interference. In this way, the ECtHR 
held that the measure was not as coercive as the ones taken as a part of a criminal procedure 
or those sanctioned in a punitive way but it nevertheless interfered with the protected sphere. 
The word administrative was used here within the meaning of “non-punitive”. Thereby, the 
case does not limit the applicability of interpretations developed in criminal investigation 
searches to cases concerning administrative inspections. 
Thereby, all interpretations developed in the judgements of the ECtHR are relevant, 
irrespective of the administrative or criminal nature of the proceedings under national law. 
Furthermore, the point made in Bernh Larsen is not relevant in the context of the inspections 
of the FCCA. The Finnish penalty payments are not comparable to purely administrative 
consequences such as discretionary tax assessment, but they entail features of a punitive 
                                                          
139 For examples of competition authority inspections, see Wieser amd Bicos Beteiligungen GmbH v. Austria, 
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sanction in the way the ECtHR has interpreted it.  This is also the case with Commission 
sanctions. 
3.2.3 Right to respect to home: business premises as protected spheres 
The right to respect to home was extended to business premises in 1992 in the case 
Niemietz144. In that case, the Court held that a lawyer’s home office was protected under the 
article. It based its reasoning on two aspects. Firstly, it considered that the French text of the 
ECHR employs the word “domicile”, which may cover also a professional person’s office. 
Secondly, the Court noted that professional activities may be carried in domestic premises 
and vice versa, which means that it is not possible to always separate those two.145 Until 
2002, this right was applicable to the business premises of natural persons146.  
With the judgement of Sociétés Colas, the Court stated that also a company's registered 
office, branches or other business premises may enjoy protection under Article 8 ECHR in 
certain circumstances147. In that case, an inspection at the company’s head office and 
branches carried out by the French competition authority, which included the seizure of 
several thousand documents, amounted to “certain circumstances”148. Since 2005, the Court 
has mostly applied the rule without the additional requirement of "certain circumstances” 
and concluded that the concept of “home” covers the registered office of a company run by 
a private individual and a juristic person's registered office, branches and other business 
premises149. In Delta Pekárny in 2014, the Court repeated the limitation of "certain 
circumstances"150, but ever since Sociétés Colas, the business premises of undertakings 
under inspection enjoy, as a general rule, the right to respect to home151. In this way, the 
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ECtHR has included undertakings in the concept of “everyone” set out in Article 8 ECHR. 
Thereby, the inspection carried out in such premises must fulfil the requirements set out in 
the second paragraph of Article 8 ECHR.  
3.2.4 Right to respect to correspondence: protection of legal professional privilege  
In majority of the cases concerning the rights of companies under authority inspections under 
Article 8 ECHR, the Court settles in finding an interference with the right to respect to home. 
Where a company has pleaded interference with their correspondence that does not contain 
communication between a lawyer and a client, the ECtHR has not examined an interference 
with that right but has taken the claim into account in the overall assessment of an 
interference with Article 8 ECHR152. An interference with the right to respect to 
correspondence is examined where the inspected documents contain materials protected 
under legal professional privilege (“LPP”). The Court has highlighted the importance of 
correspondence between a lawyer and client, and explicitly stated that such communication 
enjoys enforced protection under the Convention153. This right is a corollary of the right 
against self-incrimination, which is protected under Article 6 ECHR154 – but documents 
containing privileged communication are nevertheless protected under Article 8 ECHR, 
whereby all interferences are subject to safeguards of under this article. 
 
The case-law on legally privileged correspondence has, for the most part, been developed in 
cases concerning inspections and searches in the offices of individual lawyers or law firms. 
In these cases, the inspection inevitably covers also documents protected under LPP155. 
Niemetz was a landmark case also in this regard. First, the Court concluded that the 
protection of correspondence covers also professional correspondence. The Court based its 
reasoning on earlier case-law, in which telephone calls of professional nature and 
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correspondence with a lawyer had been found to enjoy protection under Article 8 ECHR.156 
Second, the Court established that the inspection of data including correspondence between 
a lawyer and their clients is an interference with Article 8 ECHR.157 In Wieser and Bicos 
the Court held that the right protects also undertakings158. It drew its conclusion by analogy 
from the case-law that extends the concept of "home" to "business premises".159 Wieser and 
Bicos concerned an undertaking owned by a lawyer. In Vinci, the Court established that also 
a company operating on another field may be subject to this kind of an interference, if it 
establishes that the inspection has led to seizure or copying of privileged materials.160 
 
The protected correspondence may be in any form. In Frérot and Michaud, in the context of 
natural persons, the ECtHR concluded that Article 8 ECHR protects the confidentiality of 
all the exchanges in which individuals may engage for the purposes of communication and 
that applies to all communications irrespective of their form.161 This includes, among others, 
electronic data162, electronic files and electronic messages.163 The cases concerned natural 
persons. The ECtHR has not established if this interpretation applies also to legal persons, 
but this could well be the case, as the ECtHR appears to assess a potential interference 
irrespective of the form of the communications also in those cases. In Lindstrand Partners, 
the Court held that the search in two offices in a law firm, in which inspectors "examined 
the contents of cupboards, shelves, computers and a safe" amounted to an interference with 
the applicant company's right to respect for correspondence.164  
 
In case-law concerning legal persons, the Court has not clarified what kind of 
communication falls within the definition of LPP. In Campbell the Court formulated, in a 
case concerning the rights of a natural person held in prison, that Article 8 ECHR protects 
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all correspondence between a lawyer and a client, whether it is related to litigation or not.165 
The Court has not provided a similar interpretation in the context of legal persons, but it 
simply refers to communication between a lawyer and a client. Nevertheless, it has not set 
out any limitations to LPP, such as the membership in the bar or the absence of employment 
relationship between the lawyer and the client, which are requirements provided by EU law. 
Moreover, it has not stated that only documents related to the matter under investigation 
would be protected by LPP, which is the case in the EU. There may be two reasons for this: 
firstly, the authorities are not entitled to inspect documents outside the inspection decision 
or warrant whereby such documents are out of scope by their nature or secondly, more 
interestingly, the Court considers the Campbell rule to be applicable also to legal persons. 
This reading is encouraged by the fact that LPP is protected as a part of privacy and not 
exclusively as a right of defence. However, the contracting parties maintain a wider margin 
of discretion when it comes to legal persons. Thereby, national legislation could possibly 
introduce some limitations in this regard, but the Court would be very likely to be critical 
towards such limitations and require strong justifications.   
3.2.5 Right to respect to private life: how private is office life? 
The right to respect to private life is limited to natural persons. Inspections and searches of 
business premises may interfere with the right, but in that case, it is always the right of an 
individual professional or a company employee. Thereby, this aspect of the article is of lesser 
importance from the perspective of companies. The right to respect for private life may, 
however, be taken into account in the overall assessment of the interference and its 
proportionality.  
In an inspection or a search, the interference usually takes place via inspection of documents 
that contain information related to the private life of an individual. Where the inspection 
takes place at the business premises of natural persons who exercise liberal professions166, 
the right to private life covers activities of professional or business nature167 where they 
include interactions with others168, including personal connections developed in the 
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profession169 and also professional secrets170. These rules have been developed in cases 
where the applicant is a lawyer, but this assessment was not based on the nature of their work 
but the fact that in many a profession, the spheres of personal and professional life interlink. 
In these cases, the subject of interference has been the applicant, whereby the Court has 
carried out an in-depth analysis.  
Regarding natural persons who are individual employees of companies, the case-law is less 
developed. The question has been addressed only in the context of company inspections, 
which has set limitations to the assessment. In Bernh Larsen the Court stated that it does not 
assess an interference with the private life of in individual if this individual has not 
personally complained. However, the Court formulated that personal emails and 
correspondence of employees and other persons working for the company fall within the 
sphere of private life. Moreover, the Court stated that companies have a legitimate interest 
to protect the privacy of their employees. This interest is taken into account when assessing 
the proportionality of authority measures. It also has an impact when assessing the merits of 
the case.171 
What this means in practice is that even if the inspection of private documents of employees 
is not, per se, an interference from the perspective of the employer company, it still has 
repercussions in this regard. The inspection of such documents needs to be justified, 
proportionate and the authority should take all possible measures to avoid the inspection of 
such documents. 
3.2.6 Difference in treatment of individuals and undertakings 
The ECtHR extends the protection of Article 8 ECHR to legal persons, but the protection is 
not necessarily equivalent to that of natural persons. The ECtHR has repeatedly held that the 
interferences with Article 8 ECHR rights may be more far-reaching where business premises 
of a juristic person are concerned172. This means that the contracting states retain a margin 
of appreciation regarding the measures they wish to take in investigating suspected breaches 
of law. Pursuant to the ECtHR, this margin must be used in good faith, carefully and in a 
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sound manner173. 
The Court has not specified, what more far-reaching measures mean in practice. However, 
it may be concluded that state authorities may carry out more extensive inspections or 
searches when they take place in business premises or where the materials under inspections 
are those of companies. What is noteworthy is that even if more intrusive measures are 
accepted, the normal safeguards against arbitrariness are, pursuant to the ECtHR, applicable 
to legal persons as well.  
3.3. Companies right to privacy in competition authority inspections in European 
Union 
3.3.1 Right to privacy as fundamental right and general principle 
As established above, the fundamental rights of individuals and undertakings within the EU 
are protected by a variety of instruments. Firstly, there is the CFR, secondly, the general 
principles of EU law and thirdly, the ECHR still has its influence. This is also the case with 
the right to privacy of companies under authority inspections. After the CFR gained the 
status of primary law, Article 7 CFR is, at least in theory, the most central means of 
protection. Pursuant to Article 7 CFR, everyone has the right to respect for his or her private 
and family life, home and communications.  
Pursuant to Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights174, the rights 
guaranteed under Article 7 CFR correspond to the rights guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR.  
This entails that the meaning and the scope of the two rights are the same. Furthermore, 
pursuant to Article 52(3) CFR, the ECHR sets out the minimum level of the right and the 
EU may provide more extensive protection. The Explanations further provide that also the 
limitation doctrine is the same, meaning that the interferences to the right must be necessary 
and proportionate.175 However, in practice the limitation clause set out in Article 52(1) CFR 
is not the same as in Article 8 ECHR. It adds objectives of general interest recognised by the 
Union as a further requirement for a limitation. The interpretation provided in the 
Explanations has a formal legal status, which is explicitly stated in Article 52(7) CFR as well 
as in Article 6(1) TEU176.  
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Irrespective of the presumption of corresponding scope and meaning, the interpretations of 
the two courts are not fully in line. The right to respect for business premises is, to a great 
extent, a corresponding right but the EU does not, for example, apply Article 7 CFR in the 
context of LPP documents. Vested-Hansen – who rather unconventionally addresses Articles 
7 CFR and 8 ECHR under the title “right to private life” – reminds that the rights have an 
autonomous meaning in both legal systems.177 As will be established in Chapter 4.3, also the 
safeguards differ. 
Moreover, the way to apply the articles is different. Whilst the ECtHR often addresses the 
interference with one of the rights protected under Article 8 ECHR, such as that to home, 
correspondence or private life, the CJEU have chosen a different approach in the context of 
competition inspections. It mainly refers to Article 8 ECHR or Article 7 CFR in their 
entirety, and bundles the rights provided under one concept of "privacy"178. This may be a 
consequence of the historical development of the right in the EU, as the inspection powers 
were initially measured against the general principle of protection of the sphere of private 
activities. Article 8 ECHR was introduced only later.  
3.3.2 Right to respect for home: from protection against arbitrariness to protection of 
business premises 
In European Union, companies have enjoyed a certain protection against coercive authority 
measures in their business premises since 1962. In 1962, the CJEU formulated that it 
withholds the power to examine if the measures of investigation undertaken by the 
Commission179 are excessive180. In National Panasonic 1980, the applicant company 
pleaded a violation of Article 8 ECHR, and the Court assessed if the legal framework 
regarding the legality and necessity of Commission investigations fulfills the criteria set out 
in paragraph 2 of the article. What is noteworthy is that the CJEU stated that it is unclear if 
the article is in fact be applicable to the applicant as a legal person.181 
In Hoechst in 1989, the Court stated that the protection against arbitrary or disproportionate 
intervention is a general principle of EU law. The Court formulated that the principle is 
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applicable in the sphere of private activities and it provides protection to both natural and 
legal persons.182 However, in this case, the Court explicitly held that the right to respect for 
home, as it is defined in the laws of Member States and as provided by Article 8 ECHR and 
interpreted by the ECtHR, does not protect business premises183. This statement was fully in 
line with the prevailing interpretation of the ECtHR, this case was decided prior to the 
issuance of Niemietz judgement.  
The right to respect for home was extended to business premises in 2002. With Roquette 
Frères, the CJEU established that the protection of home is also extended to business 
premises. In drawing this conclusion, the CJEU referred to Hoechst and the way the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR influenced the content and scope of the right to respect for home. 
The Court also repeated the limitation set out in Société Colas, according to which protection 
is extended to such premises "under certain circumstances". Furthermore, the CJEU 
reminded that an interference with the right may be more far-reaching regarding business 
premises than regarding spaces of permanent habitation184.  
3.3.3 Right to legal professional privilege – but not under Article 8 ECHR or Article 7 
CFR 
As established above, for ECtHR, the correspondence between a lawyer and a client 
company is subject to protection under the right to respect for correspondence. The CJEU 
has not reached the same conclusion. The CJEU has not assessed the correspondence 
dimension of neither Article 8 ECHR nor Article 7 CFR.  EU law provides protection for 
legally privileged communications as a general principle of law. 
The principle, which protects the communication between the company and an external 
lawyer, was established in AM&S. The CJEU concluded that written communication 
between a lawyer and client company is protected under two cumulative conditions, 
according to which the communications must be between an external lawyer and the client 
company and related to the rights of defence of the company in question.185 Thereby, only 
communications related to the matter under investigation is protected by LPP, whether it is 
issued prior the investigation or after it186. Moreover, this principle is applicable to lawyers 
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practicing in any Member State187. This principle sets boundaries to the inspection rights of 
the Commission. Pursuant to the CJEU, a company may refuse to produce documents if it is 
able to provide the Commission with evidence of the privileged nature of the documents.188 
In Hilti, the Court concluded that also internal notes of a company that exclusively 
communicate legal advice from an external lawyer, are covered by LPP189. Akzo Nobel 
confirmed the rule and added that LPP protects also documents that are drafted to seek legal 
advice from an external lawyer with the aim of exercising the company's rights of defence.190 
Consequently, LPP covers various types of documents but it is exclusively limited to 
communication with an external lawyer that is not employed by the company under 
investigation. The CJEU has only addressed Commission investigations in its case-law, 
whereby the definition of LPP is only relevant in the context of Commission inspections191. 
Inspections carried out by the national competition authorities, even when they are carried 
under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, are subject to national rules governing LPP192. As will be 
stated later, in Finland the scope of protection is similar.  
Andersson has identified two potential deficiencies in the protection provided by the EU. 
Firstly, she points out that in AM&S, the Court limited the protection to lawyers practicing 
in one of the Member States of the Union and secondly, that the protection covers only 
documents that are related to the subject-matter of the investigation. Consequently, 
Andersson sees two potential exceptions where legal advice is not, after all, covered by LPP: 
communications with lawyers situated outside of the European Union and legal 
correspondence that is not related to the matter under investigation. However, she points out 
that the Commission has not inspected such materials193. It is possible that the requirement 
of membership in a Member State bar could be lifted by the CJEU, as it has highlighted the 
inviolability of the relationship between a lawyer providing legal advice and a client seeking 
for advice. However, the second requirement of documents being related to the matter under 
investigation appears to be of more permanent nature. Pursuant to the case-law, the CJEU 
views LPP exclusively as a part of rights of defence – and not as form of protected 
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communication that amounts to a right on its own. However, it is not possible to effectively 
conclude that the definition of LPP would, in the context of companies, be different from 
that pursuant to ECHR. As stated above in Chapter 3.2.4, the ECtHR has provided a vast 
reading of LPP in the context of rights of natural persons but it has not clarified if this is the 
same also regarding legal persons. Moreover, it is noteworthy that when it comes to rights 
of defence, LPP protection is stronger whereby under Article 8 ECHR, the Convention 
provides the possibility to interfere with the right in proportionate manner. 
3.3.4 Companies’ right to private life: question of secondary importance? 
The ECtHR has clearly formulated that even if the right to respect to home and 
correspondence within the meaning of communication between a lawyer and a client is 
extended to companies, the right to private life is reserved for natural persons. In the absence 
of an individual complaining a violation of this right, this aspect is taken into account only 
in the overall assessment of the proportionality of the measure. In EU law, the scope of the 
right to private life is not clearly defined. The CJEU has not directly addressed a company’s 
potential right to private life or its right to protect the private life of its employees in 
competition cases.  
In CNOP the Court states that "the protection of private life provided for in Article 8 ECHR 
must be respected and the protection of home is extended to the premises of commercial 
companies"194. In Almamet, while assessing the admissibility of cartel evidence, the Court 
stated that procedures set out to protect the fundamental rights, in particular the right to a 
private life and home, are essential procedural requirements and any cartel participant may 
be sure that evidence obtained in breach of such procedures are inadmissible. In its wording, 
the Court refers to fundamental rights of an interested person, but later states that where the 
abovementioned procedures are not respected, the cartel participants are able to rely on the 
inadmissibility of evidence.195 Cartel participants, for their part, are undertakings. 
No conclusions may be drawn from these two references, as the concept of private life is 
addressed in both cases together with the right to home. Furthermore, Almamet addresses 
the importance of compliance with the lawful procedure and does not assess a potential 
violation of a fundamental right, per se. The right to private life is, neverthereless, raised in 
both cases in the context of companies. On the contrary, the CJEU has also dismissed appeals 
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concerning interference with private life as unfounded. Both courts considered in Evonik 
Degussa that documents revealing participation in a cartel are not protected under concept 
of private life.196 
To conclude, the Court has not directly assessed the applicability of the right to private life 
to companies under competition authority inspection. As for now, the question might have 
been of secondary importance, as the CJEU has, as mentioned above, applied Articles 8 
ECHR and 7 CFR in their entirety. The few cases on the topic are best suited to highlight 
the liberties the CJEU takes in its terminology related to right to private life. 
3.4 Companies right to privacy under competition authority inspections in Finland 
3.4.1 Right to privacy as fundamental right and human right 
In Finland, the right to privacy is protected under Article 8 ECHR and Section 10 FC.  
Section 10 FC provides protection to private life, honour and the sanctity of the home as 
well as to the secrecy of correspondence and other confidential communications under the 
title “right to private life”. Section 10 FC rights were introduced as fundamental rights in 
Finnish legislation upon reform of fundamental rights in 1995197. In Finland, fundamental 
rights are constructed as rights of natural persons198, and legal persons enjoy only indirect 
protection199. Certain fundamental rights are extended to legal persons as well, where the 
purpose of the provision so requires200. Pursuant to preparatory works, Section 10 FC 
protects the private life of an individual against arbitrary intrusions of the state and other 
third parties201 - which by its formulation resembles both the meaning of Article 8 ECHR 
and the early general principle of EU law. However, the scope of the right is more limited.  
3.4.2 Right to respect to home: limited protection of business premises 
The scope of fundamental rights is mainly defined by the Constitutional Law Committee 
(“CLC”) in its statements202. The CLC has repeatedly stated that as a fundamental right, the 
right to respect for home is strictly limited to spaces of permanent habitation and does not 
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cover business premises that are not used for such purposes203. Business premises and 
storage spaces may enjoy protection under the right to respect for home, but only in so far 
as they include spaces where individuals are living on a permanent basis204. Pursuant to CLC, 
these spaces enjoy a more limited protection205. Public spaces, such as offices and business 
premises are protected under Chapter 24 Sections 3 and 4 of the Criminal Code, but this 
covers only illegal intrusions carried out by individuals. 
The CLC has explicitly stated that inspections of business premises, when carried out under 
Section 35 Competition Act, do not take place in the sphere of right to respect for home206. 
The last time the Competition Act was reformed, professor Råman pointed out in his 
statement, with a reference to Société Colas, that ECtHR has broadened the concept of home 
to cover also business premises. However, he did not elaborate on the possible implications 
of this, as that was beyond the assignment given to him.207 Thereby, Section 10 FC does not 
provide protection for undertakings under authority inspections unless the homes of 
employees are inspected. This entails that when Section 10 FC is applied or referred to in 
the context of inspections at business premises, it does not provide protection equivalent of 
Article 8 ECHR. 
As regards Article 8 ECHR, the Market Court and the Supreme Administrative Court have 
applied it in Asfalttiliitto and others (MAO) and Asfalttiliitto and others (KHO)208, the so-
called asphalt cartel case. Both courts considered the article applicable and carried out an 
assessment of the proportionality of the authority measure. The courts did not explicitly state 
that company premises and/or correspondence is protected under Article 8 ECHR, but 
considered the article to be applicable209. It may be concluded that the Supreme 
Administrative Court holds that companies enjoy at least a certain protection of their 
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business premises. The Governmental Proposal for Competition Act states that competition 
authority inspection operate in a domain protected by Article 8 ECHR210. 
3.4.3 Right to legal professional privilege – but not under Article 8 ECHR or Section 
10 FC 
The CLC has not clarified if undertakings may enjoy protection of their confidential 
communications under Section 10 FC. However, in preparatory works it has been stated that 
Section 10 FC protects an individual’s right to confidential communication211 and the right 
to confidential communication pursuant to Section 10 FC is a right of citizens212. Thereby, 
for the purposes of this thesis, it is possible to conclude that companies as legal persons do 
not enjoy the protection of their communications in a way that would be relevant in 
competition authority inspections. The personal communications of individual employees 
are naturally protected. 
Communication between a lawyer and client company is protected under ordinary law and 
the definition is developed in the context of rights of defence. Section 38(3) of Competition 
Act provides that undertakings are not under the obligation to hand to the FCCA documents 
that contain confidential communication between an external lawyer and client company. 
The Governmental Proposal for Competition Act further provides that this communication 
must be related to the matter under investigation. Moreover, the communication must be of 
such nature that it may be relevant for the rights of defence of the company. The Government 
Proposal states that this provision is informative in nature and corresponds to the general 
principle of LPP developed by the CJEU and is applicable in all competition authority 
inspections in Finland.213 However, there are still certain differences. 
Pursuant to AM&S, LPP is applicable to communications between a client and a lawyer that 
is a member of a bar association within the EU. In Finland, Section 13 Chapter 17 of Judicial 
Procedure provides that also certain other lawyers providing legal advice may produce 
communications protected by LPP. Pursuant to this section the prohibition to testify is 
applicable to attorneys and counsels214. This has been confirmed by the Supreme Court in 
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2003 in A, in which the court limited the concept only to attorneys and legal counsels who 
provide assistance related to a trial215. Later legal literature has proposed that also other 
lawyers providing legal advice could be subject to LPP216, but the prevailing interpretation 
has not been challenged by a court. However, the requirement of bar membership is not 
provided by the Code of Judicial Procedure. If the EU definition would be introduced in 
Finland in this regard, only a very limited number of legal professionals would fall into the 
definition, as only approximately 10 per cent of Finnish lawyers are members of the bar217. 
Nevertheless, the Government Proposal for Code of Judicial Procedure confirms that LPP is 
limited only to external lawyers within the meaning of CJEU case-law218. 
Secondly, also the situation regarding the material scope of LPP is less clear. The Supreme 
Court stated in 2003 that pursuant to the wording of Code of Judicial Procedure, LPP protects 
only documents related to the matter subject to trial, and it decided to interpret the law 
accordingly. The reform of Code of Judicial Procedure amended the provision concerning 
the prohibition to testify. It provides now that the prohibition to testify applies also to private 
and family secrets as well as business and professional secrets an attorney or an authorized 
counsel219 has obtained when providing legal advice not related to litigation220. Pursuant to 
the Government Proposal, such information may include information of health or internal 
matters of a family, or information related to a business acquisition221. It remains to be seen, 
to what extent this reform could broaden LPP protection in competition authority inspections 
– and if this would provide a more extensive definition of LPP. The Working Group Report 
suggests that this would not be the case, as it refers to the preparatory works of Competition 
Act as well as EU definition, and repeats the requirement that the information is related to 
rights of defence222. Legal literature has not addressed this question. Ilveskero has addressed 
the repercussions of the Code of Judicial Procedure reform in an article, but only from the 
perspective of FCCA inspections in a law firm, a premises which enjoys enforced protection 
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under the ECHR and the inspection of which, according to Ilveskero, should be subject to 
authorization by the Market Court under Section 36 Competition Act in any event223. 
In A, the Supreme Court stated, after reference to Campbell and acknowledging that the 
definition of legal privilege entails all legal communication, that the need for protection is 
highest where the material may be relevant for the rights of defence. Thereby materials not 
related to the matter under investigation enjoy a lesser protection. The court drew the 
conclusion reading Article 8(2) ECHR in conjunction with Article 6 ECHR. It is noteworthy 
that the ECtHR has highlighted the importance of LPP in the context of rights of defence but 
it has, similarly, stated that legal communication is protected under Article 8 ECHR and any 
limitations to the right should be interpreted narrowly. Moreover, any interference with such 
communication should be necessary and proportionate. 
Under Finnish law, the concept of LPP is tied to rights of defence, yet the reform of Code of 
Judicial Procedure appears to broaden to concept also to certain other forms of legal advice. 
However, the definition is still provided in the Code of Judicial Procedure, which is a law 
governing trials. LPP within the meaning of Article 8 ECHR is protected also as a part of 
communications. The ECtHR has not established an exhaustive definition of LPP 
communications in the context of companies that are not law firms. It is possible that also 
non-litigation related materials could fall within the definition. However, LPP 
communications under Article 8 ECHR are not inviolable but may be interfered with under 
criteria addressed in detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis. Thereby, the protection is indeed lower, 
as interpreted by the Supreme Court, but there is still protection that may be limited only 
pursuant to the criteria. From the perspective of Article 8 ECHR, classification as LPP 
information has one main consequence: the need to subject the copying and/or inspection of 
the document to judicial review.  
3.4.4 Right to private life: focus on inspections 
As already established above, the ECHR and EU law do not protect the private life of 
companies, as this right is limited to natural persons. It may, however, have relevance in the 
overall assessment. In Finland, the literary on this topic is scarce.  The Government proposal 
on Competition Law admits that authorities do encounter material subject to right to private 
life, when they go through materials to identify documents relevant to the investigation224. 
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Råman points out that to establish the private nature of materials, the authorities have to 
assess the materials in question, whereby private information may be revealed. This amounts 
to limitation of the fundamental right.225 For the purposes of this thesis, it is not necessary 
to address the aspect of private life in more detail. 
3.4.5 Section 10 FC and Article 8 ECHR: similarities and differences 
The Government proposal on the reform of fundamental rights226 states that the term private 
life is an umbrella term that covers all aspects of the private sphere of an individual227. The 
proposal further notes that the term is used, among others, in Article 8 ECHR.228 In 2001, 
Viljanen concluded based on this formulation that the concept of private life in Section 10 
FC corresponds to Article 8 ECHR, and thereby, interpretations of the ECtHR should be 
taken into account when applying Section 10 FC229. Furthermore, in 1996 he stated that as 
the ECtHR considers that also professional aspects of life may be protected under Article 8 
ECHR, it is very natural that Section 10 rights are interpreted accordingly230. As established 
above, this reading has not been embraced by the CLC. 
Saraviita, for his part, states that the scope and meaning of the right to private life was left 
open at the preparatory stage.231 Thereby, it is not possible to say what is the genuine role of 
the ECHR in relation to the FC. Mahkonen criticised the drafters in 1997 for taking a focus 
on the right to private life and not opting for the more extensive concept of right to privacy, 
which according to Mahkonen, would have covered the rights set out in Article 8 ECHR. He 
considers the concept of private life is too narrow232. 
Section 10 FC may correspond to Article 8 ECHR to a certain extent, where the rights of an 
individual are in question. For companies, it does not grant equivalent protection. This 
feature was also identified by Råman, who stated that as the developing case-law of the 
ECtHR considers certain rights applicable to undertakings, there is, potentially, a reason for 
the CLC to take these developments into consideration – but that also the current approach 
has its own justification233. However, the CLC tends to apply exclusively Section 10 FC 
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when assessing authority measures, whereby it is possible that Article 8 ECHR is not fully 
acknowledged upon drafting new legislation. It is also noteworthy upon referring to the 
statements of the CLC that they address a right more limited than that of Article 8 ECHR 
and do not amount to statements on companies right to privacy within the meaning of Article 
8 ECHR. 
To conclude, as Section 10 FC does not protect companies and company premises, CLC 
statements in that regard do not amount to an assessment if the rights under Article 8 ECHR 
are respected. The same may be said of Article 7 CFR, as that covers also business premises. 
Normally, national fundamental rights are expected to offer more extensive protection than 
human rights instruments234, but in the context of companies, this is not the case. In the next 
chapter, I will address the safeguards required for an interference with rights protected under 
Article 8 ECHR. As Section 10 FC protects only individuals, for the purposes of this thesis, 
it is not relevant to address it in later chapters. 
4. Lawful inspection: how to safeguard an interference with the right to privacy 
4.1 The ECHR interpretation of legitimate interference 
4.1.1 Introduction to the limitation clause set out in Article 8(2) ECHR 
As established above, authority inspections in company premises interfere with rights 
protected by Article 8 ECHR. This has been acknowledged by the EU through Article 7 CFR 
and as a general principle of law, and in Finland by the Supreme Administrative Court and 
in preparatory works. An interference with the right does not amount to a violation of the 
article. The second paragraph of Article 8 ECHR sets out the legitimate exceptions to the 
right protected under the first paragraph. When the requirements of the second paragraph are 
complied with, the interference is legitimate. Firstly, the measure needs to be in accordance 
with the law and secondly, it must pursue one or more aims prescribed by the paragraph and 
thirdly, the measure must be necessary in a democratic society to achieve these aims235. The 
Court has repeatedly pointed out that these exceptions are to be interpreted narrowly236. 
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4.1.2 What kind of law justifies an interference? 
As established above, Article 8(2) ECHR requires that an interference is to be in accordance 
with the law. This entails that the interference has a basis in domestic law. As regards written 
laws, this means the law as interpreted by competent courts.237 The law must also be 
accessible to the person concerned.238 Moreover, the law needs to be "sufficiently clear”, so 
the subject may understand under which circumstances and under which conditions public 
authorities are entitled to interfere with the rights protected.239 This means that the person 
concerned must be able to foresee the consequences of the law, either on their own or with 
appropriate legal advice.240 The law must also be of adequate quality, meaning that it must 
be compatible with the rule of law241.  
The first and second requirement are fulfilled by a national law that is published – which is 
obviously fulfilled by the Competition Act in Finland and the Regulation 1/2003 in the EU. 
The requirement of sufficient clarity entails that the law should provide the general 
framework for an inspection or a search, from the description of infringements to how 
authorities are entitled to investigate, and how subjects of investigations are to cooperate in 
these investigations. The fourth requirement is a minimum standard of a kind, meaning that 
the nation law provides “some protection to the individual against arbitrary interference with 
Article 8 rights”, and that this is also sufficiently clearly formulated in the legislation242. In 
Sallinen the last requirement was not fulfilled in Finland, as national law did not specify in 
which circumstances privileged material could be subject to search and seizure243. 
In Finland, the Supreme Administrative Court assessed in Asfalttiliitto and others244 the legal 
basis of the FCCA inspections. The Market Court had established that competition authority 
inspections have a basis in law, as this was provided, at the time, in the Act on Competition 
Restrictions245. The Supreme Administrative Court held that the Act on Competition 
Restrictions sets out accurately the areas in which the authority may carry out inspections as 
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well as the materials it has the power to inspect246. Thereby, the legislation in force may be 
deemed to have sufficient level of clarity. However, at that time, there were no provisions 
governing documents protected by LPP. The courts may not have addressed the issue, as the 
applicant company did not claim this right would have been interfered with. In the 
Competition Act, the right to withhold materials protected by LPP is included. However, a 
definition of the scope of LPP is not provided. 
4.1.3 What is a legitimate aim? 
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 8 ECHR, the inference must pursue a legitimate aim of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country and be for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection 
of the rights and freedoms of others. The Court has established in cases Société Colas, 
Société Canal Plus, Delta Pekárny and Vinci that inspections related to suspected 
competition infringements pursue the legitimate aim of the economic wellbeing of the 
country and that of the prevention of crime247. 
4.1.4 What is necessary and proportionate in democratic society? 
Pursuant to Article 8(2) ECHR, the interference must also be necessary in a democratic 
society. This entails that there must be a pressing social need for the interference and the 
measures taken must correspond to the aim pursued. In other words, the measure needs to 
be proportionate.248 Only the ECtHR may carry out the proportionality assessment in 
individual cases, but interpretations established in its case-law may be used as guidelines 
also nationally, as established above. Pursuant to the ECtHR, the authority must have 
relevant and sufficient reasons for the interference249, and choose the least intrusive means 
of interference250. An inspection or a search is justified only if the evidence may not be 
obtained with less intrusive means. To ensure the proportionality of the measure in each 
individual case, national legislation and practice must provide adequate and effective 
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safeguards against abuse and arbitrariness251. These safeguards, for their part, need to be 
effective and concrete and not theoretical and illusory252. Furthermore, also individual 
circumstances of each case weigh in the assessment253. 
In its case-law, the ECtHR has identified at least the following safeguards: prior judicial 
authorization or an authority decision that is subject to judicial review254, an inspection 
decision or a warrant of sufficient clarity255 that is drafted for the particular type of premises 
inspected256, the right to be present at the inspection or a search257, the obligation of 
confidentiality of the inspecting authorities258, the right to take only copies and not seize the 
originals259, the listing of items seized or inspected260, the right to prevent the authority from 
seizing correspondence protected under LPP or the right to have them returned261, the right 
to have judicial review assessing if copied data falls in the scope of the search warrant or 
inspection decision262 and the right to judicial review of the proportionality of the measures 
taken263. The list above is not definitive, and the ECtHR has not required that all the above 
safeguards should be available in all contracting states. However, it has put forward the 
requirement that an inspection or a search, insofar as it constitutes an interference with 
Article 8 ECHR, needs to be authorized by a judge264 or subjected to a posteriori judicial 
review265. This requirement is not dependent upon other safeguards available, but judicial 
authorization or review is necessary to ensure the proportionality of the interference. A 
contrario, the absence of this safeguard amounts to violation of Article 8 ECHR. Pursuant 
to the ECtHR, prior judicial authorization and ex post facto review are the most important 
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safeguards to Article 8 ECHR rights, because the judicial authority may assess the necessity 
and proportionality of the authority measure in each individual case266.   
The ECtHR has stated that in the absence of prior judicial authorization, it must be 
particularly vigilant267. The ECtHR has also established a similar requirement to national 
courts who carry out the a posteriori judicial review268. A too limited review amounts to 
violation of Article 8 ECHR269. A sufficient review must assess the legality of the measure, 
the proportionality of the measure and the manner which the operation is carried out, which 
entails ensuring that authorities act within the scope of the search warrant270. Moreover, 
parties subjected to inspections or searches must have access to adequate redress, where the 
measure is found to be excessive271.  
The following chapter analyzes the interpretations of the ECtHR in greater detail. I will start 
with the two often-addressed landmark cases and then analyze, how rules established in these 
cases have been interpreted by the ECtHR most recently. In this part, I will also address 
cases concerning individuals. The reason for this is that in these cases, the ECtHR has 
provided some specifications regarding the required safeguards. The ECtHR has established 
that natural persons may enjoy more extensive protection than legal persons, which will be 
taken into account in the assessment below. However, it is noteworthy that the ECtHR 
provides a wider margin concerning the scope of the interference but it has not stated that 
this would be the case regarding safeguards to ensure the necessity and proportionality of an 
interference. 
4.2 Prior authorization and judicial review: developments in ECtHR case-law 
4.2.1 Delta Pekárny: setting the standard for judicial review in competition cases 
In Delta Pekárny272 in 2014, the competition authority opened an investigation into 
suspected anti-competitive behavior of the applicant company and the same day, it carried 
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out an inspection at the business premises of the company. Pursuant to national law, the 
competition authority had the right to carry out inspections as a part of an investigation and 
no authorization by a court was necessary. The authority had a wide margin of appreciation 
regarding the necessity and the scale of the inspection.273 
The competition authority informed the company of the opening of the investigation by a 
notification, which was accompanied by authorization to carry out an inspection. The 
notification mentioned the object of the investigation on a very summary level and did not 
detail the facts the suspicions were based on. The names of the agents in charge of the 
inspection were included.274  The only document that provided precise information of the 
aim of the inspection was the record of the inspection that was handed at the end of the 
inspection275. The Court focused particularly to the fact that the authority had not informed 
the applicant company which documents it was concretely looking for as a part of the 
investigation276. The representatives of the company were present at the inspection and the 
competition authority had the right to take only copies of the documents and the agents were 
under the obligation of confidentiality277. 
The Court restated the rule that the lack of judicial authorization for an inspection or an 
inspection decision subject to appeal may be balanced out by an ex post facto review of the 
legality and the necessity of the inspection278. In this case, the Court concluded that the ex 
post facto review was not sufficient. Pursuant to the Court, it was not sufficient that the court 
assessed if the agents carrying out the inspection acted within the competences provided for 
them by the law. The review was too theoretical and did not focus on the factual elements 
of the inspection. The national court did not examine the facts that led the competition 
authority to carry out the inspection and consequently, there was no judicial review of the 
opening of the inspection or the length or scope of the inspection.279 
The Court also challenged the view of the national court according to which the inspection 
was justified the moment the authority had suspicions that certain market behavior was the 
result of a contract between competitors and that proof of this contract could only be obtained 
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through an inspection. Pursuant to the Court, this presumption robbed the applicant company 
from the possibility to seek for compensation if the inspection would have been considered 
irregular and a compensation would only have been accessible via appeal to a higher court. 
Pursuant to the Court, this did not amount to an assessment of the necessity of the 
inspection.280 The Court concluded that the absence of judicial authorization combined with 
the lack of ex post facto control of necessity of the inspections meant that the applicant 
company did not have sufficient safeguards and the measure was not proportional to the aim. 
In the case, the ECtHR did not stipulate if the national competition authorities took measures 
that would be contrary to Article 8 ECHR but it focused on the availability of efficient 
judicial review – which has become a recurring subject to assessment especially in the past 
years. Here, it put forward also the proposition that inspection decision subject to judicial 
review would amount to equal safeguard of a prior judicial authorization. It is, however, not 
clear, if also the measures taken during the inspection would be subject to appeal in this 
context or just the decision, which is the case in the EU. However, in other cases the ECtHR 
has required that also the measures taken should be subjected to review. 
4.2.2 Vinci: judicial review of the nature of suspected LPP documents 
In Vinci281 in 2015, the ECtHR assessed if the national court reviewed in an adequate way 
the nature of documents allegedly containing information protected by LPP. The French 
legislation in force provided an ex post facto judicial review of inspection decision and 
measures taken during the inspection, including the assessment of alleged privileged nature 
of documents.  
In Vinci, the authorities copied a great number of documents and entire electronic mailboxes 
of certain employees of the inspected companies. The material included also documents 
protected by LPP282. The Court considered that the documents taken by the authorities were 
identified and listed in a sufficient manner, when the name, size, origin and digital imprint 
were recorded and this listing was provided for the inspected company with the copies of 
the seized documents283. During the inspection, the applicants had not had the possibility to 
know which documents were seized or express their view of the nature of the documents. 
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According to the Court, as the applicants could not prevent the seizure of documents 
protected by LPP, they should be able to challenge the seizure of such documents ex post 
facto284.  
In the case at hand, French law provided the possibility to make an appeal to have the 
documents returned or destroyed effectively, including the electronic copies of the 
documents. Pursuant to the Court, where the judge who carries out the review has been 
informed of reasoned allegations that seized documents, which have been identified, do 
either not have link with the inspection or are protected by LPP, it is for the judge to carry 
out a concrete proportionality assessment and if necessary, order the return of such 
documents. In the case at hand, the Court considered that it is not sufficient if such review 
only assesses the regularity of the inspection on a more general level and not carry out a 
concrete assessment. 285 
What is noteworthy in this case is that the Court stated that where the company subjected to 
inspection cannot prevent the seizure of documents containing, in the view of the company, 
information protected by LPP, the company under inspection should be able to have the 
nature of the documents assessed ex post facto in a concrete and effective way286. In this 
case, pursuant to the formulation of the Court, such procedure was provided by national 
law287. In the case at hand, such assessment was carried out by the national court. However, 
it is not possible to conclude, if the national court should be the first instance to carry out the 
assessment of the nature of the documents or if this could be carried out by another instance. 
However, the Court has repeatedly held that this kind of communication enjoys enforced 
protection under the ECHR and that the discretion of authorities should be subjected to 
judicial review where it has an impact of the rights of the natural or legal persons subjected 
to inspection. Thereby, judicial review must be available at least in the cases where the 
companies subjected to inspection do not agree with the outcome of the alternative procedure 
to establish the nature of suspected LPP documents. 
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4.2.3 Zosymov: obligation to have all interferences reviewed  
Zosymov in 2016 concerned a search and long-term seizure of computer equipment, data 
storage devices and other possessions, which took place in the context of a criminal 
investigation into a suspected breach of copyright288. In this case, the Court found a violation 
of Article 8 ECHR, as national law did not provide sufficient safeguards against arbitrariness 
and the judicial review was not sufficient.289  
The applicant in the case was a natural person, but the searches were carried out in non-
residential premises of the office, car and garage of the applicant290. The search amounted 
to an interference with the right to respect for home within the meaning of a non-domestic 
premises291. As the inspected premises were business premises, the case may give insights 
to questions concerning undertakings as well, even if the subject of the rights is an 
individual292. Furthermore, the applicant was not a suspect in the criminal case under 
investigation, whereby the inspection did not have any repercussions in that regard – which 
sets it apart from most cases concerning natural persons. The interference with Article 8 
ECHR did not have an impact on their rights of defense, for example, but was problematic 
only from the perspective of Article 8 ECHR. It must be noted, however, that it was not clear 
at the time of the inspection if the applicant would be a suspect at some later point. 
The search and seizure was carried out by police officers without a prior judicial 
authorization. The applicant received a “deed of inspection and seizure”, which did not state 
the legal basis of the inspection or the limits of the powers of the inspecting officers. 
Furthermore, the access to judicial review was limited. A complaint regarding the lawfulness 
of the inspection could only be brought in the context of the criminal trial initiated after the 
inspection, and in the case at hand, the case had been stagnant for several years and the 
applicant was not given an official status in the process, as he was not a suspect. The ECtHR 
stated that it is not sufficient if the subject of an inspection may appeal the inspection in the 
context of a later trial, the initiation of which is subject to the discretion of the authorities. If 
the authority would not initiate a trial, there was no access to judicial review. The Court 
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concluded that a limitation of this kind is incompatible with Article 8 ECHR.293 
In the case, the Court particularly emphasized the access to judicial review. It formulated 
that all measures affecting human rights protected under Article 8 ECHR must be "subject 
to some form of adversarial proceedings before an independent body competent to review in 
timely fashion the reasons for the decision and the relevant evidence"294. In the case, it was 
not sufficient that these questions could be addressed in a later trial, when the initiation of 
the trial is subject to discretion of authorities. In other words, the right to judicial review of 
a search measure may not be dependent upon the authority initiating a further trial after the 
inspection or search. Either a prior judicial authorization or a judicial review of at least the 
justification of the search or inspection is necessary in all situations.  
It must be pointed out that in the case at hand, the authority measures were Kafkaesque at 
the worst: the seizure of belongings continued for several years and the applicant did not get 
a response regarding his official status in the investigation for years. However, the 
requirement to have access to judicial review irrespective of a later trial was not dependent 
upon the level of arbitrariness involved but it was put forward as a necessary safeguard to 
ensure the proportionality and necessity of any interference. Safeguards are not relevant only 
where the authority acts in an arbitrary way, but they should be in place to prevent and 
redress situations where this happens – whether it is a structural problem or an individual 
event. Thereby, the additional clarification that access to judicial review should not depend 
upon the possibility of a later trial, could be applicable also to situations where the inspection 
is carried out in the business premises of a legal person. In any case, the requirement of 
access to judicial review was, once again, repeated.  
4.2.4 Modestou: scope and timing of judicial review  
The case Modestou (2017) concerned an inspection carried out in the domestic and business 
premises of the applicant, who is a natural person. The inspection was a part of a preliminary 
investigation into a suspected criminal offence, including the establishment of criminal 
organization.295 In this case, the Court found a violation of Article 8 ECHR, as the ex post 
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facto judicial review was not adequate. The case has been requested to be referred to the 
Grand Chamber. 
In Modestou, the inspection was not ordered by a national court but by a prosecutor of the 
court of appeal.296 The inspection order was drafted in general terms: it stated as its aim to 
verify if criminal offences have taken place, namely that of establishment of a criminal 
organization by certain named individuals and people linked to them. This encouraged the 
investigators to seize all items and documents that, in their view, have a link to the matter 
under investigation.297 The Court noted that the authorization did not contain information of 
the investigation or of the items and documents to be seized, which granted extensive powers 
to the inspectors. Furthermore, the authorization did not include the names of the persons 
under inspection.298 Consequently, the inspectors seized two computers and hundreds of 
documents, and it was not clear if all the seized items and documents were related to the on-
going investigation.299 The applicant was also not present during the inspection.300 
Pursuant to the Court, the abovementioned short-comings put an additional stress on the ex 
post facto judicial review. This review did not fulfill the standards set by the Court. The 
applicant had made an appeal to the national court of appeal, and the court delivered a 
decision over two years after the investigation. Furthermore, the national court focused on 
assessing if it is possible to order an inspection at the preliminary stage of an investigation. 
The Court stated that the national authorities failed to justify the search with relevant and 
sufficient grounds.301 Consequently, the Court established a violation of Article 8 ECHR.302  
The ECtHR has not previously stated what is an adequate – or inadequate – timeframe for 
the ex post facto judicial review, not in the context of natural persons and their domestic 
premises nor in the context of legal persons and their business premises. In this case, the 
ECtHR explicitly mentioned the lengthy waiting period as a contributing factor to the finding 
of a violation. Obviously, there were other serious short-comings in the procedure, namely 
the quality of the warrant and the absence of the applicant during the inspection, which is a 
big default. However, even if the Court did not establish, per se, that two years is too long a 
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time to wait for judicial review, the fact that the Court brought it to focus is not irrelevant. 
The ECtHR has established that the review should be effective, whereby it is likely that a 
belated review is not deemed effective. The case obviously concerned the rights of natural 
persons, and interferences which those rights are considered more serious by the Court. 
However, the Court has never held that the quality of safeguards would depend upon the 
subject of the inspection or search being a natural or legal person. Where the subject is a 
legal person, the authorities may take more extensive measures but the proportionality of 
these measures must, nevertheless, be ensured. A judicial authorization or judicial review 
that is effective, is a requirement applicable to all persons. It is possible that it should also 
be available in a reasonable timeframe. 
4.2.5 Janssen Cilag S.A.S: sufficient judicial review of LPP documents 
The case Janssen Cilag303 in 2017 concerned a competition authority inspection in France. 
The ECtHR found the case manifestly ill-founded, but in its assessment, it further clarified 
some of the interpretations made in Vinci. In the case at hand, the ECtHR held that 
company’s rights under Article 8 ECHR were not violated, as the company under inspection 
had the possibility to have the suspected confidential nature of documents copied by the 
authority reviewed by the national court of appeal.304 
The Court stated that in the case at hand, contrary to Vinci, the rights under Article 8 ECHR 
were effectively protected. Firstly, it stated that the rights are protected where the national 
judge carries out a sufficient proportionality assessment by assessing the privileged nature 
of the suspected documents. Here the applicant had, however, failed to identify such 
documents.305 Due to this, it was not necessary for the national court to carry out the review. 
The legal framework was deemed sufficient and the ECtHR considered that the national 
court would, where questions regarding the nature of the documents had been raised, 
assessed the nature of such documents. 
In this case, the Court stated that the assessment of the suspected privileged nature of the 
documents under inspection constitutes a part of the proportionality control carried out by 
national judge. The Court did not state that a judicial authority should carry out a potential 
initial assessment, but that the possibility to subject the nature of the documents to court 
assessment is part of the obligatory judicial review. However, as the assessment was 
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dedicated to a national court, the procedure was fully in line with requirements of Article 8 
ECHR. 
4.2.6 Conclusions on safeguards 
In its recent case-law, the Court has further highlighted the need to have all interferences 
with Article 8 ECHR rights subjected to judicial review, at least regarding their necessity. 
This has been brought up in cases concerning both legal persons and natural persons. The 
Court has set efficient judicial review as a prerequisite for the legitimacy of an inspection or 
search and seizure. There have not been any cases in which the Court would have deviated 
from its stance in this regard. This was very clearly formulated in Zosymov.  
Furthermore, it has added the requirement of timeliness, which in Modestou was not fulfilled, 
when the review was to take place two years after the inspection. The case concerned the 
inspection of both home and business premises, and concerned criminal charges against an 
individual, whereby the need for protection could be higher. However, the ECtHR has also 
established that the margin of appreciation of states, which is wider regarding legal persons, 
should be used in good faith and sound manner. Moreover, this margin of appreciation 
applies to the scope of an interference, and not the safeguards thereof. The safeguards are at 
place to ensure that the interference is not greater than is necessary. Thereby, even if the 
timeframe set out in Modestou cannot be directly extended to all cases and to undertakings 
as well, the timeliness of the review must not be irrelevant regarding companies. It is also 
difficult to establish that a belated review would amount to an effective safeguard.  
What is more, in Zosymov, again in the context of a natural person and criminal investigation 
but with formulation addressing all interferences, the Court concluded that judicial review 
should not be subject to the discretion of authorities and a potential later trial.  It is not 
possible to draw a straight-forward conclusion that this would be required in all 
circumstances. In the least, the requirement to have the basis and scope of the inspection 
reviewed in all cases is applicable to, well, all cases, by the formulation of the Court. 
What is noteworthy is that safeguards for an inspection must be in place to secure the respect 
for the rights set out in Article 8 ECHR. It is not decisive if a possible irregularity has 
repercussions in a later trial. The ECtHR has never tied the requirement of judicial review 
to a risk of a later sanction. An interference takes place even if the holder of a right is not 
later charged with any kind of offence or sanctioned in an administrative procedure. Where 
the interference with Article 8 ECHR has an impact on rights of defense, this contributes in 
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the overall assessment. This is, however, only a part of the overall assessment. The 
safeguards are in place to protect the rights provided by Article 8 ECHR. A well-established 
safeguard is a prior or a posteriori judicial review of the interfering measure. This should be 
secured to all holders of rights, be they natural or legal persons. 
Similarly, the Court holds that documents containing LPP need to be protected effectively. 
In the cases reviewed, it was a national judge who carried out the assessment of their nature. 
When this was done thoroughly, Article 8 ECHR was respected. However, it is not possible 
to conclude that this assessment should be carried out by a court as a first instance, as the 
ECtHR has not address the question in the context of other procedures than a court 
procedure. In Janssen Cilag the ECtHR labelled this assessment as a part of the overall 
proportionality assessment carried out by a court. Thereby, it is possible that only the 
possibility to subject a decision of a different authority to judicial review would be sufficient. 
Anderson has concluded that the ECtHR provides vast inspection rights regarding 
companies, as it does not require a prior judicial authorization and considers acceptable the 
copying of vast amounts of material as well as continued inspections at authority premises. 
However, to balance this wide margin of appreciation, the ECtHR does require an ex post 
ante judicial review.306 Andersson has described this as an absolute requirement307. In a way, 
the ECtHR empowers national courts to ensure the enforcement of human rights norms. This 
approach is not inherent in the legal systems of all contracting parties, some of which prefer 
to carry out the assessment upon drafting legislation. By highlighting the need of access to 
judicial review in all interferences, the ECtHR also highlights the importance of right to 
privacy. 
Anderson furthermore argues that pursuant to the ECtHR, a court should order a restitution 
of documents outside the scope of inspection decision or protected by LPP308, a conclusion 
which is drawn also by De Jong and Wesseling309. This has, however, been only stated in 
cases where the national law designates the court as the instance to assess the nature of 
suspected privileged documents and the instance which takes decisions regarding those 
documents. The requirement of court assessment could be implied, as the nature of the 
documents is assessed in the context of the assessment of the regularity of the inspection, 
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but it is not evident if this may be only done by a court. It is possible that an alternative 
mechanism would serve the same purpose. 
4.3 Safeguards in EU 
4.3.1 Judicial review: legality of decision v. protection of fundamental rights  
In Deutsche Bahn, the General Court identified five categories of safeguards provided by 
EU law to companies under Commission inspections. Those will be presented here in a 
cursory way to establish the framework, but due to the scope of the work, only judicial 
review will be addressed in detail. 
The first and very central safeguard against arbitrary measures is the inspection decision. It 
sets the limits to the inspection rights of the Commission by stating the subject matter, 
purpose and scope of the inspection. All the documents inspected should be related to the 
subject matter of the inspection310. However, the investigation is at preliminary stage at this 
point, which means that the Commission is not required to provide precise legal analysis of 
the infringements, estimate the timeframe of the infringements or even define precisely the 
relevant market311. 
Second, certain documents fall outside the scope of inspection by their nature. The Court has 
established that undertakings do not need to provide documents of non-business nature and 
those protected under LPP. Moreover, oral explanations are protected, which means that 
undertakings are not under the obligation to answer questions in a way that would amount 
to self-incrimination. The effectiveness of the three first safeguards may only be secured by 
a posteriori assessment. Under the legislation in force, the measures taken during an 
inspection may only be appealed in the context of the final decision.312  
The third safeguard concerns, similarly, documents. The Commission is not entitled to carry 
out inspection by force, which means that undertakings may refrain from handing the 
Commission the document requested. This carries the risk of facing a penalty payment.313 
Fourth and fifth safeguard concern judicial supervision. The national courts maintain the 
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right to supervise any coercive measures taken by the Commission. The undertaking may 
also request the General Court to review the regularity of the inspection decision.314  
In Deutsche Bahn, the CJEU assessed if the EU legislation and practice regarding the 
authorization of an inspection fulfil the requirements set out by Article 8 ECHR. With 
reference to Société Colas and settled case-law of the ECtHR, the CJEU concluded that the 
absence of prior judicial authorization may be balanced by a posteriori judicial review315. 
This is also the current interpretation of the ECtHR, whereby no prior judicial authorization 
is necessary. However, as regards the a posteriori review, the CJEU delivered an 
interpretation that is not fully in line with the judgements of the ECtHR. It will be addressed 
below. 
The national courts, however, carry out a limited review before an inspection takes place 
within their jurisdiction. The Commission has the power to take inspection decisions 
independently, but it may only take coercive measures at the territory of Member State in 
compliance with the national legislation. Thereby, if national legislation requires a prior 
judicial authorization to enter premises of a company without the permission of the company 
in question, the Commission must obtain one.316 
For the part of the ex post facto judicial review, the CJEU further assessed in Deutsche Bahn 
that this requirement is fulfilled in the EU, as the decisions taken by the Commission are 
subject to review by the European Union courts and upon such review, the Courts carry out 
a review of the law and the facts317. This does not, however, fully correspond to the 
requirements set out by the ECtHR. The company under inspection may appeal the content 
of the inspection decision, but the measures taken may be appealed only after the final 
decision issued by the Commission. 
Where the inspection decision is appealed and annulled under Article 263 TFEU, the 
documents and other evidence obtained under the illegal inspection cannot be used as a basis 
for a decision on the suspected infringement.318 The General Court formulated in Almamet 
that evidence is inadmissible when it is obtained in disregard of the relevant regulations 
governing the inspection in question, even if there is no claim of harm caused by such 
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measures.319 The aim is to prevent the Commission from taking so called fishing 
expeditions320. 
Curiously, the General Court formulated in Almamet that any cartel participant has the right 
to appeal to the General Court a suspected infringement of safeguards protecting 
fundamental rights, which include, in particular, the right to respect for home and private 
life321. Pursuant to the Court, this means that if the Commission does not follow the 
procedure set out in Regulation 1/2003 but for instance seizes documents outside the scope 
of the inspection decision, any cartel participant may subject these measures to the review 
of the CJEU.322 This applies exclusively to situations where the Commission acts in breach 
of the relevant regulations323. However, the Court did not clarify which right an irregularity 
would infringe. In the event the inspection does not take place in the premises of the injured 
party, the right to respect for home could hardly come into question and the right to private 
life is also limited to individuals.  
In Nexans, the General Court confirmed that the way the Commission conducts an inspection 
may be appealed only when seeking annulment of the final decision regarding the suspected 
competition infringement324. This entails that only inspections leading to final decisions may 
be appealed. Furthermore, this means in practice is that the delay between the measures and 
the access to review may be several years325. However, Nexans proposes an alternative 
control mechanism for undertakings. Where the companies do not accept that certain 
documents fall in the scope of the decision, the companies may subject Commission 
measures to a more timely review by refusing to produce the requested documents. In that 
case, the Commission takes a decision ordering a fine or a periodic penalty payment and the 
company may challenge that decision in General Court. The Court then assesses if the 
documents enjoy protection under the fundamental rights of right to  privacy and rights of 
defence326. 
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In Deutsche Bahn, the applicant company appealed three inspection decisions. The ECJ 
annulled two inspection decisions that were based on the first inspection, where the 
Commission authorities knowingly seized documents falling outside the scope of the 
inspection decision. The Court condemned measures taken by the Commission during the 
first inspection, but this only had an impact on the two later inspection decisions.327 Thereby, 
the irregularities that took place during the first inspection were not assessed in the context 
of the first inspection. In this way, the applicant company did not have the proportionality 
of the interference with its rights protected under Article 8 ECHR – or Article 7 CFR – 
assessed but only the legality of the later Commission decisions was under review.  
The CJEU focuses on ensuring that decisions taken by the Commission are in compliance 
with the law328. This means that it has, mainly, an interest in reviewing the legality of the 
inspection decision. Measures taken during the inspection are subject to review only if they 
lead to another decision, which would be the final decision on the suspected infringement. 
Thereby, the CJEU focuses on assessing that the decisions are taken in compliance with EU 
law. What the CJEU does not do is ensure the inviolability of the business premises of 
companies situated in the EU as a right in its own. If this would be the case, the companies 
would be able to appeal also the measures taken under the inspection irrespective of the 
issuance of the potential final decision. Andersson argues that due to this, the EU does not 
provide effective protection of human rights329. 
As established above, the ECtHR has set out a general requirement of ex post facto judicial 
review as a safeguard for Article 8 ECHR. From that perspective, it is not sufficient that 
inspection measures are assessed only if there is a decision imposing fines. In the absence 
of such decision, the companies do not have access to judicial review to ensure that the 
interference with their right to respect to home and correspondence is not excessive in scale. 
However, the EU is not under a legal obligation to alter its practice to correspond with that 
of the ECtHR. Article 52(3) CFR may, pursuant to certain interpretations, give a legal basis 
to grant at least equivalent protection. However, nothing obliges the EU to comply with the 
ECtHR standard. 
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4.3.2 LPP protection: adequate protection of certain documents 
The procedure to prevent communications between an external lawyer and a client company 
from being inspected is, however, at the level prescribed by the ECtHR. The EU scrutiny is 
even at a higher level, as it enables companies to challenge the nature of the documents at 
any point of the inspection. Where the company under inspection claims protection under 
LPP, there are two ways to assess the privileged nature of the document. Firstly, the 
Commission may take a cursory look of the document in question to confirm the claim put 
forward by the company. This cursory look may cover "the general layout, heading, title or 
other superficial features of the document".330 
Secondly, the company may refuse even a cursory look, if it suspects that it would not suffice 
to prove the privileged nature of the document or if there is a risk that it would reveal 
privileged information. In that case, the Commission puts the document in question in a 
sealed envelope and takes it to the Commission premises in Brussels. After this, the 
Commission adopts a formal decision requiring the company to produce the document in 
question. This enables the company to challenge the decision at the General Court, which 
will carry out the assessment of the privileged nature of the document. To ensure that the 
Commission will not investigate the document in when waiting for the decision of the 
General Court, the company may apply for interim relief until the General Court delivers its 
decision.331 
The ECtHR has not put forward strict requirements concerning the handling of LPP 
documents, insofar as their content is not revealed to the authority. Thereby, removing the 
documents from the premises of an undertaking is not problematic from the perspective of 
the ECHR. Moreover, the fact that the final decision concerning the nature of the documents 
is delivered by the General Court further ensures that the procedure is in compliance with 
the ECHR. However, as established above, it is not sure if the definition of LPP is 
corresponding, whereby the procedure may not protect all documents that would fall in the 
category of LPP pursuant to ECtHR definition. The procedure protects only documents 
related to the investigation at hand. The ECtHR has not specified exactly what kind of 
communication is protected under LPP and could this definition be broader than that of EU 
                                                          
330 C-550/07, Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akros Chemicals v Commission, EU:C:2010:512, paras 79–88.  
331 Ibid, paras 79–88.  
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law – meaning that also legal advice not related to the case under investigation or issued by 
other lawyers than those member to the bar of a Member State could be protected by LPP.  
4.4 Safeguards in Finland 
4.4.1 Judicial review in 2017: subject to proposal for penalty payment 
In Finland, competition authority inspections of business premises are not subject to prior 
judicial authorization. Moreover, the right to appeal an inspection decision or the measures 
taken during an inspection has been limited only to those cases which lead to proceedings at 
the Market Court. Pursuant to Section 44 of Competition Act, a decision to conduct an 
inspection in business premises may not be appealed. The prohibition against appeal was 
introduced by the Act 303/1998 amending the Act on Competition Restrictions.332 At the 
time, the decision to conduct an inspection was considered as a preparatory act to the 
competition investigation and thereby, according to general principles of administrative law, 
not subject to appeal.333 However, today this classification seems rather odd when compared 
to other situations, where the right to appeal has been limited. Pursuant to the general 
principles of Finnish administrative law, the prohibition against appeal applies, inter alia, to 
decisions that have an impact only within the administration or that are of general nature, 
preparatory or related to technical execution334. At the outset, decisions concerning details 
of technical execution and a decision to carry out a full-scale dawn raid do not appear to be 
comparable. Due to limitations of space, I will not address the administrative law 
classification in more detail. 
The very wording of Section 44 of the Competition Act states that the inspection decision 
may not be appealed, but in practice this is possible in the proceedings at the Market Court335. 
Any suspected irregularities in the inspection decision or in the inspection procedure may be 
addressed in the proceedings concerning the principal claim – that is, if the FCCA makes the 
proposal for a penalty payment to the Market Court. The FCCA makes approximately one 
proposal per year336, but it carries out inspections in approximately five matters per year, 
                                                          
332 HE 243/1997, p.35. 
333 HE 243/1997, p.35; Petäjäniemi-Björklund 2008, p. 460. 
334 Mäenpää 2006, para 324. 
335 Statement of the Supreme Administrative Court 18 May 2017 on the reform of Competition Act, p. 5. 
336 See the case register at www.kkv.fi/ratkaisut-ja-julkaisut/kilpailuasiat/esitykset-markkinaoikeudelle.  
63 
 
and the number of inspected premises varies between 15–21337. The FCCA does not provide 
the information of how many individual undertakings are subjected to inspections yearly338. 
In the event the FCCA does not make a proposal for a penalty payment, the companies under 
inspection do not have access to judicial review. The Working Group Report states that 
legality control is carried in the context of main proceedings and that companies subjected 
to inspection may file an administrative complaint339, which is provided by the 
Administrative Act. This, however, does not amount to judicial review. Pursuant to Section 
53a of Administrative Act, any person may file a complaint concerning the legality of a 
measure taken by an authority or the failure of an authority to fulfill their responsibilities. 
Moreover, other similar irregularities may be addressed in a complaint340. In practice, this 
means that the complaint always concerns the measures taken or omissions of the authorities, 
and not per se the decision, upon which these measures may be based on341. Measures of an 
individual officer may be addressed in a complaint made to the FCCA. In questions 
concerning the FCCA as an authority, the competent authority are the supreme guardians of 
law342, that is the Chancellor of Justice343 or the Ombudsman344. 
The administrative complaint does not lead to an alteration or reversal of a decision, because 
supreme guardians of law do not have the competence to do this. What they may do is give 
to the authority an opinion or notice of the correct application of law.345 Moreover, the 
supreme guardians of law do not have the competence to order restitution. Where the 
measure or omission is “particularly reprehensible", the supreme guardians of law may file 
a criminal law suit or require damages.346 The threshold to these measures is high, as they 
require the authority to carry out a suspected criminal act or cause identifiable pecuniary 
damage to the company. Petäjäniemi-Björklund points out that the authorities handling the 
                                                          
337 Working Group Report, p. 14. This does not specify what number of the inspections are related to 
suspected anticompetitive agreements and abuse of dominance and what, if any, to mergers and 
acquisitions.  
338 Email response of Rainer Lindberg, Deputy to the Head of Department of the FCCA, of 26 June 2017. 
339 Working Group Report, p. 15. 
340 Mäenpää 2016, s. 112. 
341 Prosessityöryhmän välimietintö 2009:19: Hallintolainkäytön kehittäminen, p. 121. 
342 In the event the complaint concerns individual civil servant, the complaint may be filed with the superior 
of the individual in question. 
343 See, for example, Decision of the Deputy Chancellor of Justice of 30 December 2010: Päätöksenteon 
viipyminen Kilpailuvirastossa. 
344 See, for example, Decision the Deputy Ombudsman 0f 18 December 2013: Asian käsitelyn viivästyminen 
Kilpailu- ja kuluttajavirastossa.  
345 Section 53 c of the Administrative Act; Mäenpää 2016, p. 114; Mäenpää 2005, p.9 
346 Section 53 c of the Administrative Act; Mäenpää 2016, p. 114. 
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complaint have a very wide margin of appreciation, as the procedure is complementary to 
normal remedies. This is underlined by the fact that an administrative complaint may be filed 
by any individual and not exclusively by a party whose rights and duties are at play.347 
The Government Proposal on the reform of Administrative Act explicitly states that the 
administrative complaint is not a legal remedy, and it does not aim to alter or overrule an 
authority decision348. Moreover, the administrative complaint is described as a general 
supervisory mechanism of administration, which may be activated by everyone349. The 
administrative complaint is complementary to the normal appeals procedure, and it is 
relevant particularly in the cases where there is no access to ordinary remedies350. This 
entails the provision public services, and authority measures that do not have an impact on 
the rights and duties of individuals or legal persons, undertaken in for example in education, 
police action and the production of social and health services351. Again, an announced 
competition authority inspection does not appear to be comparable to the measures listed in 
the government proposal. The ECtHR, for its part, has classified the administrative 
complaint as not a legal remedy352. The decision on the appealed matter is not subject to 
appeal353, as it is not considered to affect the rights and duties of the complainer354.  
The preparatory works and legal literature highlight the supervisory role of an administrative 
complaint. It is repeatedly stated that it is best suited for situations where the rights and duties 
of individuals or legal persons are not at play. Thereby, it can hardly be constructed as a 
remedy in situations where the right to privacy is interfered with. Nevertheless, this is the 
only review mechanism available for companies who have been subjected to authority 
inspections in the case the FCCA does not make a proposal to the Market Court. 
As established above, the ECtHR has interpreted Article 8(2) ECHR as requiring prior 
judicial authorization, an inspection decision subject to appeal or a posteriori judicial review 
                                                          
347 Petäjäniemi-Björklund 2008, p. 432. This was at the time when administrative complaint was not 
included in the Administrative Act. However, the procedure was available and the competences of the 
authorities handling the complaints were equivalent. 
348 HE 50/2013: Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle laiksi hallintolain muuttamisesta, p 4; see also Helminen, 
Fredman, Kanerva, Tolvanen and Viitanen 2014, p.793. 
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Mäenpää 2005, p. 144. 
350 HE 50/2013, p 4. In Finnish, the term is säännönmukaiset muutoksenhakukeinot. 
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352 Janatuinen v. Finland, Application no. 4692/04, 8 December 2009 (admissibility). The decision was issued 
four years prior to the government proposal in question. 
353 Section 53 d of the Administrative Act. 
354 HE 50/2013, p 4. 
65 
 
of authority actions, where there is an interfere with the right to privacy. As established 
above, administrative appeal does amount to such review. Judicial review is limited only to 
the cases where the inspection leads to proceedings at the Market Court. Thereby, the Finnish 
legislation in force does not provide judicial review in the extent required by the ECtHR. 
The availability of a review is dependent upon the authority initiating a trial. 
It is also noteworthy that where the inspection leads to a trial at the Market Court, the delay 
between the inspection and the the proceedings is normally two years or more355. This seems 
to be in conflict with the requirement of timely review. It is possible that a judicial review is 
not effective, where the waiting period is excessively long. As established above, this was 
the case in Modestou – in the context of a natural person. 
4.4.2 Judicial review in the courts: focus on the legal basis 
The Market Court and the Supreme Administrative Court have applied Article 8 ECHR in 
one case, Asfalttiliitto and others356. Other judgements of the courts do not address the right 
to privacy set out in Article 8 ECHR. The companies have not challenged the inspection 
decision or any measures taken by the authorities in the proceedings at the Market Court357. 
At the outset, there are two potential reasons for this. Firstly, the companies under inspection 
consider the authority measures to be legitimate, whereby there is no need to appeal. 
Secondly, it is possible that where the trial concerns fines that may amount to millions of 
euros358, the companies focus on other aspects of the case. The right to privacy becomes a 
secondary interest. Pursuant to the Statement of the Market Court to the Working Group 
Report, the absence of claims does not mean that there would not be need for legal 
remedies359. 
                                                          
355 In Linja-autoliitto, Matkahuolto ja linja-autoyhtiöt, the competition authority carried out inspections 
between August 2011 and October 2011. The proposal for a sanction was made approximately four and half 
years later in January 2016.  In Eltel the period was shorter, as the inspections were initiated in February 
2013 and the proposal made in October 2014, after year and a half. In Valio the inspections were carried 
out in January 2011 and March 2012, and the proposal was made in December 2012, almost two years after 
the first inspection.  In Iittala, the inspections were made in October 2006 and October 2007, and the 
proposal was made in April 2010.  Here, the delay was over three years from the initial inspection. In HL 
Group, Kaha, Koivunen ja Örum, the competition authority carried out the inspection regarding Kaha in July 
2004 and the proposal was made in July 2006, again some two years later.  In the case Metsäliitto 
osuuskunta ja Stora Enso, the dawn raids were carried out in May 2004 and the proposal was made in 
December 2006, that is two and half years after the inspection. 
356 Asfalttiliitto ja muut (MAO) 
357 Statement of the Market Court 15 May 2017 on the reform of Competition Act, p. 2. 
358 The latest penalty payment proposal of the FCCA amounted to 38 million euros. See Kilpailuviraston 
määräys ja seuraamusmaksuesitys 25.1.2016 (Linja-autoliitto ja muut), p. 81–96.  
359 Statement of the Market Court 15 May 2017 on the reform of Competition Act, p. 2. 
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In the case of Alfalttiliitto and others360 one of the applicants claimed the inspection of their 
business premises was carried out in a way that violated their right to respect for privacy 
under Article 8 ECHR. They based their claim on Société Colas, where the inspection was 
deemed disproportionate, as the authority seized a vast number of documents without a prior 
judicial warrant and in the absence of the representatives of the company. The inspection at 
the business premises of the Finnish applicant was authorized by the FCCA361 and carried 
out without police supervision. During the inspection, the FCCA inspected the calendars of 
the management of the company as well as personal items of the employees to ensure that 
they are of personal nature. This happened in the absence of the relevant employees. The 
applicant requested that the inspection materials obtained in breach of Article 8 ECHR 
should not be used as evidence.362 
The argument was rejected both by the Market Court and the Supreme Administrative Court. 
The Market Court considered that firstly, the inspections had a legal basis in the Act on 
Competition Restrictions and second, the legislation in force at the time of inspection set 
sufficient limitations to the inspection powers of the authorities. Section 20 Act on 
Competition Restrictions authorized the FCCA to carry out an inspection to supervise the 
compliance with the provisions of the act, as well as the regulations and orders based on the 
act. Furthermore, Section 20 Act on Competition Restrictions provided the FCCA the right 
to gain access to business and warehouse premises, land and vehicles. Moreover, the 
authority had the power to inspect the correspondence, the books, data recordings and other 
documents that might be relevant in the supervision of compliance with the Act on 
Competition Restrictions and regulations and orders based on the act. Lastly, the FCCA had 
the right to require oral explanations at the spot as well as take copies of the inspected 
documents.363 
In its reasoning, the Market Court put weight on the legal basis of the inspection. 
Furthermore, it considered that there were sufficient differences between the case at hand 
and that of Société Colas. It did not specify on the issue. The Market Court concluded that 
even in the absence of prior judicial warrant and the absence of police supervision, the 
                                                          
360 Asfalttiliitto ja muut (MAO) 
361 At the time of the inspection and the court proceedings, the FCCA was officially the Finnish Competition 
Authority. For the sake of coherence, the Finnish Competition Authority will be also addressed under the 
current name. The name was changed when the Finnish Competition Authority and the Finnish Consumer 
Authority were joined in 2013. 
362 The reply of Valtatie Oy in Asfalttiliitto ja muut (MAO). 
363 The statement of reasons of the Market Court in Asfalttiliitto ja muut (MAO). 
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inspection was not carried out in breach of Article 8 ECHR or any provisions of the Act on 
Competition Restrictions.  
The Supreme Administrative Court considered, similarly, that the legislation set sufficient 
limitations to the discretion of the authority. The court pointed out that the ECtHR has not 
established a prior judicial warrant as a prerequisite for an inspection, but that the ECtHR 
has deemed that a sufficiently precise legislation and the existence of adequate legal 
safeguards balance out the absence of a warrant. The Supreme Administrative Court further 
highlighted that the French competition legislation at the time provided the authority with 
an extremely wide margin of appreciation regarding the necessity, number and duration of 
the inspections.364 The court stated that the Act on Competition Restrictions, to the contrary, 
sets out in a precise way the areas in which the authority may carry out inspections as well 
as the materials it has the power to inspect. Furthermore, the court pointed out that the 
company under inspection had the right to legal review at two instances (i.e. the Market 
Court and the Supreme Administrative Court).365 
The judgements of the Market Court and the Supreme Administrative Court have features 
that have been condemned in later case-law of the ECtHR. The focus is on the legal basis of 
the inspections and the clarity of the legislation. The courts do not address the measures 
taken during an inspection. However, the in Asfalttiliitto and others, the applicant referred 
to Société Colas where the central issue was the existence of a prior judicial warrant. 
Thereby, as the applicants contested the legitimacy of the inspection in the absence of a 
judicial warrant and did not raise the need for an effective judicial review. 
4.4.3 Judicial review to be: subject to proposal for penalty payment 
The Working Group of the Competition Act reform does not propose reform of the appeals 
system. It did identify the following alternatives to the current situation: a prior authorization 
by the competent court, the right to appeal the inspection decision or the inspection 
procedure, or a combination of the two.366 Pursuant to the representatives of the national 
courts, the court granting the permission has only very limited means to set boundaries to 
the inspection beforehand. The representatives consider that any potential irregularities will 
be best assessed in the main proceedings. The representatives of the Finnish Bar Association 
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and of industry organisations, for their part, consider it necessary to subject the inspection 
decision to appeal.367 The Working Group recommended to leave the situation at it is. 
The Working Group consulted professor of constitutional law Tuomas Ojanen on the topic. 
Ojanen commented both the inspections of business premises and those of domestic 
premises. Pursuant to Ojanen, the fact that the CLC did not address the prohibition against 
appeal upon the preparatory stage of the Competition Act entails, at the outset, that this is in 
compliance with the Finnish Constitution.368 Ojanen also highlights that the judgements of 
the ECtHR should be read in the light of the facts of each case. He also puts forward the 
argument that the ECtHR has not required judicial review in all cases. As a conclusion, 
Ojanen states that court supervision may, however, be necessary at some point, but that the 
ECtHR does not provide a clear answer to this.369 
From the perspective of the ECtHR judgements concerning Article 8 ECHR, Ojanen’s 
conclusion appears to conflict the position of the ECtHR. From the perspective of other 
ECHR rights370, judicial review may not be an absolute requirement, but the ECtHR has 
indeed interpreted Article 8 ECHR as requiring judicial review of the interference – in 
advance or in retrospect – in all cases. This is the interpretation the ECtHR has put forward 
repeatedly and without exceptions. Furthermore, the reference to the compliance with the 
Constitution is not relevant for companies under inspection. As established above, the 
Constitution does not protect the rights of companies when it comes to the right to privacy. 
Furthermore, the CLC has not referred to Article 8 ECHR when assessing the legitimacy of 
the prohibition against appeal. Thereby, the statements of the CLC on this matter may not 
take into account Article 8 ECHR and the relevant developments of case-law. 
Judicial authorization or review, for their part, are a requirement put forward to ensure that 
interferences with the right to privacy do not amount to violations thereof. It is possible that 
in Finland, companies right to privacy is not constructed as a real human right subject to 
protection under all circumstances. This approach is highlighted by the statement of the 
Ministry of Justice on the Working Group Report. In the statement, the Ministry of Justice 
stipulates that in the absence of a proposal for a penalty payment, a company subjected to 
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inspection does not have a significant need for legal remedies371. In Finland, an inspection 
is not viewed as an interference with a protected sphere – or if so, it is meaningful only if it 
leads to further consequences.  
In this regard, Finland has chosen a path different from the EU, too. It is true that the 
Commission has more extensive powers than the FCCA at the different stages of the 
investigation. The possibility to appeal the inspection decision may, in this regard, be 
justified by the Commission power to take final decision of fines imposed. However, also 
the FCCA has certain decision-making powers, as it takes decisions regarding the 
competition infringements. It also prepares the proposition for a penalty payment. In doing 
so, it may employ materials obtained in unannounced inspections. Thereby, the powers of 
FCCA are not insignificant. Moreover, as the Commission procedure falls short from the 
ECtHR standard, it is difficult to argue why the Finnish standard of safeguards should be 
lower. 
If Finland would introduce to all companies not only the possibility to appeal an inspection 
decision but also the measures taken during the inspection the protection would, on the 
contrary, be more extensive that in the EU. A Commission inspection in Finland could lead 
to the potential scenario where the measures of the Finnish authorities assisting the 
Commission agents would be subject to judicial review in Finland but the measures of the 
Commission authorities are, pursuant to EU legislation, only subject to appeal in the context 
of the final decision. Pursuant to EU law, national courts are not competent to assess the 
legality of Commission measures but that assessment may be only carried out by the CJEU. 
As stated above, the contracting parties to the ECHR do have the obligation to ensure that 
the ECHR is respected in their jurisdiction. Thereby, the compliance with EU law in this 
scenario would lead to a breach of an obligation under ECHR – or vice versa. Technically, 
this is already the case as the case-law of the ECtHR does put forward the requirement of a 
judicial authorization or judicial review. Such conflicting situations could be avoided where 
also the EU would adopt the standard of the ECtHR. 
4.4.4 LPP protection: in the hands of authority 
When it comes to the documents protected under LPP, the procedure in Finland differs from 
the EU procedure. Pursuant to Section 38(3) Competition Act, undertakings are not obliged 
to hand to the FCCA correspondence between an external lawyer and the client company. 
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However, there are no provisions governing the procedure to establish the privileged nature 
of the documents. Where the FCCA and the undertaking do not agree on the nature of the 
document, it is for the FCCA to make the decision. The FCCA copies the controversial 
document and assigns it to an officer who is not involved in “the material handling of the 
matter” and does not participate in the decision-making process concerning the matter. The 
officer is entitled to take a cursory look of the document to assess if it fulfills the criteria of 
LPP. Where the officer considers the document protected by LPP, the document is returned 
to the company in question. Where not, the document is subjected to inspection.372 This 
decision is not subject to appeal as such but it may be appealed to the Market Court in the 
context of the proposition of a penalty payment.  
The Working Group has suggested that this procedure would be enshrined in the 
Competition Act with minor adjustments. The procedure would entail that the review is 
carried out by an officer of the FCCA whose tasks do not include competition matters.373 
The access to judicial review would remain the same, whereby the decision taken is not 
subject to appeal374.  
Pursuant to the members of the Market Court heard at the Working Group, the limitation is 
justified as in the absence of a proposal for a penalty payment, the undertaking in question 
has no need for legal remedies. In this case, the document protected by LPP is not used 
against the company375. Similarly, Råman has stated that in a competition authority 
inspection, the need for procedural safeguards and legal remedies is more limited than in 
seizures carried out in criminal law procedures. In these cases, the independent judicial 
supervision is necessary in his view.376 This interpretation is in line with the judgement of 
AM&S, where legal professional privilege was limited only to documents related to the issue 
under investigation. In this way, LPP is constructed mainly or exclusively as a part of rights 
of defence. Pursuant to the ECtHR, LPP is tied to the right to privacy at a more general level 
whereby the need judicial review is not tied to the documents being used in a later trial.  
As established above, the case-law of the ECtHR puts forward the requirement of judicial 
review of controversial documents but it does not establish that an initial assessment could 
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not be made by the authority. What is decisive is the possibility of a timely judicial review 
where LPP documents are suspected to be seized or copied. The ECtHR has not considered 
problematic the seizure of such materials, insofar they will be returned to the undertaking or 
destroyed once the LPP nature of the documents is established. This leaves open the 
possibility for the authority to carry out the initial assessment. Thereby, the Finnish 
procedure would be in line with the ECtHR interpretation – but only where the decision 
made by the authority could be subjected to a timely judicial review. In legal literature, De 
Jong and Weisseling consider the assessment carried out by a competition official a 
sufficient safeguard for LPP377 - insofar as it is complemented with the right to appeal378. 
Where the inspected company would agree with the assessment, there would be no need to 
judicial review. 
When it comes to the differences between Finnish and EU procedure, those may again be 
justified by the different competences of the competition authority. The Commission has the 
competence to make the final decision on the matter, whereby the privileged material might, 
when exposed, have an influence on the final decision. In Finland, this decision-making role 
is reserved for the Market Court. However, there are also risks in Finland, as the information 
contained in the LPP documents may still influence the investigation and even contribute to 
the proposition made to the Market Court. The separation of powers does not prevent the 
abuse of information protected by LPP. Thereby, only the possibility to have the nature of 
the document reviewed by an independent body where the authority and the company do not 
agree on the LPP classification would ensure the full protection of LPP documents. This is 
also the procedure required by the ECHR. Moreover, Savola has proposed that a discrepancy 
between the level of protection in Finland and the EU is problematic from the perspective of 
justice policy379 - but that is not tied to the right to privacy, per se. 
5. Conclusions 
Pursuant to the case-law of the ECtHR, all interferences with the right to privacy as provided 
by Article 8 ECHR must be subject to judicial authorization or a posteriori judicial review. 
An unannounced competition authority inspection at company premises is by its nature an 
interference with Article 8 ECHR. Similarly, the seizure, the copying or the inspection of 
documents protected by LPP is an interference with this right.  
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The interference with the right to respect to home, within the meaning of business premises, 
takes place when the authorities initiate inspection at the premises. Pursuant to the case-law, 
a company should be able to subject both the inspection decision and the measures taken 
during the inspection to judicial review. The interference with the right to respect to 
correspondence, for its part, takes place when documents protected by LPP are handled by 
the authority. The ECtHR has stated that the company should be able to either to prevent the 
seizure or copying of such documents or alternatively have the possibility to have them 
returned or destroyed. Furthermore, it has stated that where there is a suspicion that 
documents under inspection include material protected by LPP, the reviewing judicial 
authority should assess the nature of these documents. However, it has not explicitly stated 
that all controversial documents should be subjected to judicial review at first instance to 
establish, if they contain LPP information. This leaves open the possibility to have the nature 
of controversial documents assessed in an alternative procedure. Nevertheless, judicial 
review should be available as a final safeguard, as this is the requirement for all interferences 
with Article 8 ECHR. Moreover, the ECtHR has not provided an exhaustive definition of 
LPP in the context of companies’ right to privacy. It is possible that the definition of LPP 
covers also legal advice not related to litigation, whereby the definition would be broader 
than in the EU and in Finland, and trigger the safeguards also where such documents are 
handled.  
In the EU, the right to privacy is protected under Article 7 CFR and general principle of EU 
law. Article 7 CFR does, in principle, correspond to Article 8 ECHR. Moreover, Article 
52(3) CFR leaves open the possibility to provide more extensive protection. In this way, the 
ECHR provides protection within the EU even if the EU is not a contracting party. In 
practice, the question is more complex. The case-law of the ECtHR has an ambivalent role, 
as the standards set by the ECtHR are not directly adopted by the EU. The CJEU applies the 
standards in its own way, in the context of EU law. This was evident in Deutsche Bahn, 
where the CJEU referred to the case-law of the ECtHR but in its final assessment, focused 
on very different points than would have been the case in the ECtHR.  
The CJEU has not provided an exhaustive interpretation of the relationship between Articles 
7 CFR and 8 ECHR from the perspective of companies under competition authority 
inspections. It remains unclear how, and to what extent, the judgments of the ECtHR 
contribute to the definition of the EU fundamental right, and if the EU aspires to provide 
also similar safeguards to ensure that the right is respected. As for now, the possibility to 
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subject the inspection measures to judicial review only when appealing the final decision of 
the Commission does not appear to be in line with the ECtHR standard. Thereby, irrespective 
of the references to the ECHR, the protection of the right to privacy in the EU does not 
correspond to the standard set out by the ECtHR. However, the EU does not have a legal 
obligation to meet that standard. It is not a contracting party to the ECHR nor does it bind 
itself to the judgements of ECtHR by the provisions of EU law.  
In Finland, the role of the ECHR and the judgements of the ECtHR is, at the outset, less 
complex. Finland as a state actor is bound by the ECHR and any relevant interpretations put 
forward by the ECtHR. Nevertheless, companies right to privacy under competition 
authority inspections does not seem be interpreted fully in the same way. This may have to 
do with the relative novelty of the right – or the way the rights of companies are viewed. 
Bottomley has proposed that the discussion on human rights of companies suffers from a 
cognitive bias: people expect companies to do bad things. In this view, rules should be in 
place to protect people from companies and not to protect companies from state actors.380 
Similarly, the actual harm caused by an authority inspection may be hard to construct. The 
Commission and the FCCA both investigate suspected infringements and in doing so, inspect 
business documents – which they just copy and not even seize. Put this way, an inspection 
is not dramatic interference. However, it still entails an entry into company premises and 
databases, as well as requires the company to take measures after the inspection to review 
the inspected materials itself. Andersson and Legnerfalt argue, in the context of Commission 
inspections, that an inspection amounts to a serious invasion of the integrity of the 
companies. The inspection also has repercussions in the company, as the companies 
normally must start an internal investigation on the matter and carry out compliance 
checks.381 Thereby, even if an inspection is a justified way to investigate suspected 
infringements, it still operates in a protected sphere and is a burden to the company in 
question. This is even more relevant, as all companies subjected to inspections are not found 
guilty of competition infringements. 
It cannot be ignored that the right to prior or a posteriori judicial review could be misused. 
Any company willing to hinder an investigation could certainly benefit from appeals 
procedure. Appeals could also be recommended by external company lawyers, who would 
have the financial incentive to do so. This would put an additional burden on the competition 
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authority and its resources, as well as cause additional work to the national courts. It is well 
known that public authorities do not, to put it simply, have extra time or money. However, 
that same argument could be turned around. If the resources are not sufficient to being with, 
the risk of human errors grow – and at the same time, the need for protection of the rights of 
undertakings who may be subjected to interfering measures. From the perspective of ECHR, 
resource questions have not amounted to a credible defence.  
In the EU, the CJEU handles the appeals of inspection decisions as well as carries out the 
assessment of the nature of documents that are suspected to contain information protected 
by LPP. Only the right to appeal the inspection measures is limited. The reason for this may 
be the internal logic of appeals procedure: the aim of appeals procedure is the avoidance of 
illegal decisions. The inspection measures are subjected to judicial review only to the extent 
they may have an impact on the final decision. The second possible explanation is that the 
CJEU simply is not a human rights court. Its purpose is not to investigate potential violations 
of fundamental rights but to ensure that the actions of the Commission are legitimate. 
Curiously enough, the EU is still closer to the ECHR standard than Finland, a contracting 
party of 27 years. The possibility to appeal inspection decisions and the possibility to subject 
suspected LPP documents to court assessment partially fulfil the requirements put forward 
by the ECtHR. Finland, for its part, subjects these questions to judicial review only if the 
investigation leads to proceedings at the Market Court. A potential reason for this may be in 
the traditions of fundamental rights protection. Lavapuro points out that fundamental rights 
are supervised differently in different legal systems382. Some have chosen to carry out the 
assessment upon drafting new legislation whereas others entrust courts with this role – and 
those two ways do not easily mix383. Finland has chosen to carry out the assessment at the 
preparatory stage, where the CLC plays a decisive role. Thereby, the legislation in force 
should, in principle, be in compliance with the human rights obligations and where 
authorities act within their competences, the rights be respected. Mäenpää reminds that upon 
accession to the ECHR, there were fears of transition of powers from the CLC to courts384 - 
and there may still be reluctance to extend court supervision on the basis of human rights 
obligations. The EU, on the contrary, has chosen the latter way. The CJEU has the 
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competence to assess the validity of EU legislation, and it has also played an active role in 
developing fundamental rights protection in the EU. 
By not becoming a contracting party to the ECHR, the EU has maintained the possibility to 
be more flexible with the judgements of the ECtHR. They CJEU may draw inspiration from 
them, but it may also reach different conclusions. This happened in Deutsche Bahn: the 
CJEU referred to ECtHR case-law, after which it settled to assess if irregularities taking 
place during an inspection rendered following inspection decisions illegal. In doing so, it did 
not fully assess if the measures taken during the inspection were a violation of right to 
privacy nor did it find problematic that this question could be answered only in the context 
of an appeal of the potential final decision. Thereby, CJEU continues to draw inspiration 
from the ECHR and the judgements of the ECtHR, but it is not willing to review, for 
example, the existing appeals procedure on that basis. Thereby the appeals procedure for 
competition inspections established in the case-law of the CJEU remains intact, even where 
the ECtHR interpretations develops further. 
The EU does not have a legal obligation to comply with the ECtHR judgements. Finland, 
for its part, is bound by the ECHR and for that matter, required to follow developments in 
the case-law of the ECtHR. As for now, it seems very clear that Article 8 ECHR does put 
forward the requirement to allow companies to subject both the inspection decision and the 
measures taken during the inspection to judicial review either before the inspection or 
afterwards. All companies subjected to inspections should be granted this possibility under 
Article 8 ECHR. Where this possibility is limited only to a potential later trial, to which only 
a small number of inspections leads to, Article 8 ECHR is not fully respected. Furthermore, 
even in those cases, the long waiting period between the inspection and the review may not 
be sustainable under Article 8 ECHR.  
The Working Group Report suggests that the requirement of judicial authorization or judicial 
review is not taken fully into account upon the Competition Act reform. The situation may, 
however, be different upon the final Government Proposal. As for now, it seems that the 
right to privacy as provided by Article 8 ECHR is not fully respected as a right of its own 
and a right that requires sufficient safeguards. My study has identified following potential 
reasons for this. Firstly, the CLC focuses on interpreting Section 10 FC and thereby, only 
addresses the rights of natural persons. The CLC has not assessed if the rights of companies 
under Article 8 ECHR are respected. Nevertheless, the statements of the CLC are used as a 
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source when drafting new legislation and in doing so, this feature of the statements is not 
acknowledged, at least not openly. Secondly, judicial review required under Article 8 ECHR 
is confused with the right to fair trial required by Article 6 ECHR. These articles address 
different situations. Article 8 ECHR is triggered upon interference with the right to privacy, 
whereas Article 6 ECHR is relevant in court proceedings. Finally, it is also possible that right 
to privacy is considered as a right of lesser importance. The drafters may weigh the additional 
burden caused to authorities against the value of companies’ right to privacy to the detriment 
of the latter. An appeal to the ECtHR of an inspection case would bring clarity to the 
situation. It is likely that the ECtHR would, also in that case, put forward the requirement of 
judicial review – or reverse this well-established rule. 
